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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis, would essentially focus on the emergence of “Somali Scientific Socialism” and it 
is major impact on the economy and politics of the ‘Somali Republic’ at the time. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the existing literature of the 
Somali state conflict, and mainly focuses on the economic and political impact of “socialism” 
on Post-independent Somali Republic. Deductive Research approach with case study method 
is employed. A secondary data in the form of journals, books, academic papers, dissertations, 
reports and online publications is used as data sources and is consulted in the form of 
qualitative manner. In this thesis, theories on state conflict is reviewed in order to justify the 
main objectives of doing this research;  the two major theoretical approaches on Somali state 
conflict is studied i.e. instrumentalists and traditionalists approaches. Accordingly, the major 
findings of this study shows that, the country’s economy was deeply devastated by the 
‘socialist system’. The Somali economy experienced serious macroeconomic crisis, including 
economic stagnation, poor economic growth, higher deficit ratio and higher unemployment. 
The trade deficit has increased to millions of dollars and food import was drastically high. 
The Thesis concludes that ‘socialism’ had profound impact on the economy of the country, 
the economic performance of Somalia was very disappointing. In the first years of its rule, 
production of almost all major food crops declined, this created that the country have to rely 
on food aid and large loans. Somalia’s economy during this period was disastrous in 
comparison with the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, and Kenya. Barre and his 
socialist style system created clan division and augmented ethnic clashes due to nepotism, 
disparity, treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare organizations which 
later ousted the regime in 1991. 
Key Words: Somalia, Somaliland, Socialism, Scientific Socialism, State Collapse, Economic 
Collapse, Civil War, Statelessness. 
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ÖZET 
 
Tezde öncelikli olarak Sosyalizmin ortaya çıkışı ve “Somali Cumhuriyeti” üzerindeki önemli 
ekonomik ve siyasi etkileri üzerine odaklanıldı. Tezin temel hedefi Somali devlet çatışmaları 
üzerine yazılan literatürün daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmak ve “Sosyalizmin” Somali 
Cumhuriyeti’nin bağımsızlık sonrasındaki sürecinde ekonomik ve siyasi etkilerini 
incelemekti. Çalışmada tümdengelim metodu kullanılarak temellendirmeler yapıldı. 
Gazeteler, kitaplar, akademik metinler, tezler, raporlar ve online yayınlar ikincil veri 
kaynakları olarak kullanılarak niteliksel düzeyde bir çalışma ortaya çıktı. Bu tezde devlet 
çatışmaları üzerine ortaya konan teoriler araştırmanın temel hedeflerini kanıtlamak için tekrar 
gözden geçirildi. Bunlar araçsal ve klasik yaklaşımlar olarak iki temel bakış açısını kapsıyor. 
Bu bakış açısıyla, çalışmanın temel bulguları gösteriyor ki ülke ekonomisi “sosyalist 
politikalar” yoluyla ciddi bir şekilde harap edilmiştir. Somali ekonomisi ekonomik durgunluk, 
düşük ekonomik büyüme, yüksek bütçe açığı oranları ve yüksek işsizlik oranları ile birlikte 
çok ciddi makro krizler yaşamıştır.  Bu süreçte ticaret açığı milyon dolarlara çıkarken, gıda 
ithalatı da ciddi oranlarda yükseldi. Tezde  “sosyalizmin” ülke ekonomisi üzerindeki derin 
etkileri ve Somali’nin ekonomik performansına tarif edilemez tahribatları analiz edilmeye 
çalışıldı. “Sosyalist” yönetimin ilk beş senesinde neredeyse tüm gıda ürünleri üretimi azaldı 
ve ülke gıda yardımlarına bağımlı hale geldi ve de büyük borçlanmalar oluştu. Bu süreçte 
Somali ekonomisi komşu ülkeler olan Etiyopya ve Kenya’ya oranla feci durumdaydı. Barre 
ve onun sosyalist modeli klanların ayrışmasına neden oldu ve iltimas, eşitsizlik, ihanet, etnik 
soykırımlar yüzünden de etnik çatışmalar baş gösterdi ayrıca rejimi 1991’de yıkan gerilla tipi 
örgütlenmeler ortaya çıktı.  
 
Anahtar Kavramlar: Somali, Somaliland, Sosyalizm, Bilimsel Sosyalizm, Devletin Çöküşü, 
Ekonomik Çöküş, İç Savaş, Vatansızlık  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  The Definition of “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” 
In this section of the thesis, I would like to define, what does “Somali Scientific 
Socialism” meant to Siad Barre and for the Somali society in general. According to 
Payton (1980), although there is no clear evidence which supports the idea that soviets 
secretly planned the regime’s October coup, it assured that there was a “coincidence of 
interests” existed between Siad Barre and soviet strategic objectives in the horn of Africa 
(Payton, 1980). 
In a public ceremony, on  21st  October 1971, Mohamed Siad Barre declared that “ in 
order to realize the interest of the Somali people….the full of development of their 
potentialities … we solemnly declare Somalia as socialist state” (David Laitin, 1976).  
For Pestalozza (1974), the assumption of the power, most of the coup leaders were very 
much convinced of the supremacy of “Barre’s scientific socialism”.  
However, for General Siad Barre, he himself declared to the Somalis that “[f]or us, 
“Socialism” is simply defined; it is a system in which the state takes the primacy 
responsibility for the political, social and economic development of the nation” 
(Castagno, 1971).  He also explained that, their choice of “[Somali] scientific socialism” 
(hereafter, the term “Somali Scientific Socialism” refers to the Barre’s version of 
“Socialism” in the Somali Republic) is to mobilize the people to achieve their major 
goals: reducing poverty, illiteracy and diseases.  
 Pestalozza (1974), noted “Scientific Socialism” for Barre and his supporters in the SRC 
was the following: a method to overcome nationalism without principles, which may give 
a role to the conservative elements; a way to reject deficient forms of “Socialism” such 
as Islamic socialism, African socialism, Arab socialism; a method of class struggle that 
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can be used to eliminate economic dependency for exploited societies; and a strategic 
method for economic development” (Pestalozza, 1974:34).  
The Somali coup leaders to achieve their revolutionary goals firm theoretical guidelines 
are needed and they have believed that “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” could provide the 
necessary organizational skills. He noted that, “[Somali] Scientific Socialism” meant a 
method of organizing the Somali society to: 
1. Bring the most important parts of the economy into realm. 
2. Improve capacity of resources ; 
3. Reduce inequality; 
4. Encourage participation in democratic process; 
5. Establish official script of the Somali language; 
6. Reduce the trade deficit; 
7. Reduce foreign dependency such as the west. 
However, some scholars argues that, the military leaders pursued “Somali Scientific 
Socialism” just to legitimize their rule (Lewis, 1982; Samatar, 1988).  
In December 1971, General Siad Barre gave long speech, saying that “we [Somali] people 
believe that, there is no such “African”, “Western” or “Soviet” Socialism. There is only 
“Scientific socialism” (Castagno, 1971).  
So, for Barre it was not only bringing “scientific socialism” to his people, there was a 
secondary objective, which was giving back the Promised Land occupied by Ethiopia to 
Somalis. According to David Laitin (1976), Barre seemed “to be offering his people the 
promised land rather than scientific socialism”.  
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How Barre Legitimized the “Somali Scientific Socialism”  
In this part of the thesis, I am going to briefly explain, how Barre legitimized his rule and 
how he implemented his “Scientific Socialism” as different tools. As mentioned, the 
Somali military regime tried to legitimize their seizure of power and implementation of 
their version of “Somali Scientific Socialism” in every aspect. The SRC pressured to 
legitimize their rule in Somali Republic soon after the coup. Their first step was to create 
a relentless stream of propagandas against the civilian administration that they have 
replaced.  
So, justifying his actions, Siad Barre had listed all the weakness regarding the civilian 
administration which he said “[t]he civilian government proved their inability to move 
the nation in to the direction of prosperity…the political leaders exploited tribal 
feelings”1.  
The second move of Barre to legitimize his rule was to create a system of power 
mentioned as “Somali nationhood”. He claimed that his move was to save the country 
from anarchy. He noted in a long speech “[w]e soldiers are not good politicians, but there 
was absolutely no choice”. 2 
Moreover, he established a system, an ideology of “Somali Scientific Socialism” that he 
vowed it as a participatory approach of creating a prosperous and respected Somali 
nation.  Barre mentioned “[w]e are devoting all our energies toward destroying all forms 
of national disunity, including tribalism and elitism”. 3 
 
 
                                                          
1 See Castagno (1971) 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
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However, Siad Barre conveyed the regime’s decision of implementing his “Scientific 
Socialism” to the public in October 1970. For him, the ideology was preserving Somalis 
needs. In his first year anniversary speech he said “[Socialism] is the most humane 
ideology in keeping with man’s needs” (Pestalozza, 1974).  
So, the main message of Barre to legitimize his ideology was pointing out to the Somalis 
that this is the only way they can achieve rapid economic and social startups.  
How Barre implemented his “Somali Scientific Socialism” ideology.  
After legitimizing both his coup and his version of “scientific socialism” in Somali 
Republic, he laid down different approaches to implement his rule. I would like to 
summarize the main frameworks mentioned in the following paragraphs.  
As nationalism principle: Barre used his “Scientific socialism” as replacement of 
tribalism and clan segmentation, not only the urban people but also the nomads had been 
reached. He justified this move by removing all the constraints to participation and at the 
same time ending the dependency to foreign products and outlays. He mentioned in an 
interview “…this is a system of nationalism built on participation and social 
mobilization” (Lewis, 2002: 44).   
As a system compatible with Islam: Barre’s controversial move was comparing his 
“Somali Scientific socialism” with the religion of Islam. Previously, Islam has offered 
considerable resistance to even nationalism and modernization of education. Barre, at that 
time intimidated the most reluctant of conservative doctrine, he rather suggested a new 
approach towards the Islamic faith. Before the announcement of Somali script, many 
members of the SRC went to religious schools and told the teachers that resistance would 
be costly (Laitin, 1976). In 1975, ten religious scholars were executed in public for 
preaching against the revolution and “socialism”.  
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Finally, Barre articulated the faith in a new way. Most of his speeches were constantly 
referring to the Kor’an. In a speech during Eid-Aldha in 1970, Barre said “our Islamic 
faith teaches us that its inherent values are perennial and continually evolving as people 
progress”. Barre rejected the idea of ‘religion is the opium of the people’. He noted 
“Kor’an is the foundation of our moral and ethical system and the government has the 
responsibility of supporting it”. He insisted to the religious leaders to address his ideology 
as “non-contradiction” approach (ibid).  
According to Barre “there is no conflict between Islam and socialism” (Castagno, 1971). 
He was quoted as saying that “if we decide to regulate our national wealth, it is not against 
the essence of Islam” (Patman, 1990).  
As reduction of foreign dependency and development framework: The other aspect 
of his new nationalism ideology was to reduce the dependency on foreign countries. He 
was especially very concerned over the import of food while many parts of the country’s 
land had not been cultivated. Said Barre’s only achieved goal during this process was 
writing the Somali script (Laitin, 1976).  
In 1971-75 Barre developed two important development programs, the idea was to create 
an independent viable economy. In addition to this, many government institutions such 
as banks and industries has been nationalized. For example, the Italian Banco di Roma 
and Banco di Napoli, the British National and Grindlays Bank and the Egyptian Bank 
were tookeover by the state; oil distributing companies, Agip and Shell were nationalized; 
the Italian-Somali sugar industry (SNAI) and Italian-Somali Electric Society (SEIS) were 
among those affected by the nationalization act (Ismail, 2010:103).   
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1.2 Background of the Study 
In Somali Republic, the years of 1970s, 80s and 1990s, serious economic crisis and a 
period of political upheavals emerged. The Somali economy suffered from long and harsh 
civil wars, major political crisis, severe periodic droughts, and years of chaos and 
instability. In those years, particularly at the end of 1971, Somali Republic experimented 
“Somali Scientific Socialism” few years later, macroeconomic crises had emerged, and 
those are included, huge internal and external economic imbalances, high inflation, and 
serious economic stagnation (Mubarak, 1996).  
Barre and his socialist style system created clan division and augmented ethnic clashes 
due to nepotism, disparity, treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare 
organizations which later ousted the regime in 1991. 
In the African “Socialism” literature, it has been critically discussed that the “Socialism” 
had spread in Africa in early 1970s. According to Metrowich (1967), few African states 
adopted “Socialism” in 60s and 70s and those were, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Algeria, 
Burundi, Sudan, Egypt, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tanzania (Metrowich, 1967). 
In this regard, Thompson agrees "in twentieth century Africa, were majority of its 
population are rural pastoralists with subsistence cultivators, were not likely a topography 
for “Socialism” that targeted the urban working class as their main impetus for socio-
political endeavor" (Thomson A, 2013).  This thesis, would essentially concentrate on the 
emergence of “Socialism” and it is major impact on the Somali Republic4 at the time.  
In this regard, in contending with the arguments about how the ideology of “socialism” 
had spread in Somalia for the first time, it has been noted in the literature that Mohamed 
                                                          
4 Somali Democratic Republic was formed after the unification of the two Somali colonies in July 1st 
1960. 
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Siad Barre5, a military dictator came in power in a bloodless military coup and renamed 
the country “The Somali Democratic Republic” based on what some scholars noted as 
‘Somali Scientific Socialism” ideology6. Besides, the idea was to align the Somali state 
with the USSR in the cold War. He disqualified all clan structures, however, he had 
concentrated the political power within his inner circle, Marehan sub–clan7. 
According to Abdi Ismail (2010), as soon as they came in power, the military suspended 
all formal political institutions of the country; the constitution; the Supreme Court; the 
national assembly and political parties were suspended, their activities were banned. The 
democratically elected civilian regime was replaced by the SRC8 and they started 
monopolizing all government main institutions. Although people were not satisfied the 
civilian leaders, but the military regime was worse, their economic performance was 
poor.  Dr. Abdi Ismail, an Economist at the University of Helsinki wrote that: 
 “....People felt that the state betrayed the confidence they had put in it, expressing 
that discouragement by comparing the Somali state leaders [elite] with colonial 
authorities”.  
                                                                                          (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 85) 
 In the contrary, people were not that much satisfied, there were grievances against the 
two previous civilian administrations before the military come to power, he further 
                                                          
5 Mohamed Siad Barre was the military dictator and President of the Somali Democratic Republic from 
1969 to 1991.  
6 See the definition of “Somali Scientific Socialism” in Page 1 
7 To understand the Somali Clans and their sub clans see Appendix A. 
8 SRC: Supreme Revolutionary Council (the highest Supreme council of the military regime), they clearly 
prohibited the gathering or formation of any political association. The Soviets put a pressure on SRC and 
ordered them to create a Socialist party to replace the military council. Siad Barre (The Dictator) announced 
in 1971 that the SRC's intention was to create a single-party government. The SRC begun to organize what 
has been described as a "vanguard of the revolution", these “Party-men” was composed of a socialist elite 
mainly from the military and few from the civilians. The National Public Relations Office (NPRO) was 
designated to make propagandas for Scientific Socialism.  
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discussed “…Somalis wished for a reversal of the situation and vowed that a system like 
this will soon come to an end, but the situation of the military regime was far worse than” 
(Abdi Ismail, 2010: 86). 
On the other hand, the military regime assassinated the president of the civilian regime 
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, who was visiting Las’anod, a region in the north, he has been 
killed by one of his body guards. It has been reported that there was an aborted attempt 
of killing the president one year before, that was 1968. My thesis at this point, agrees that 
this was the starting point of the State conflict, in the sense that, overthrowing the fırst 
civilian regime of Somali state created a political vacuum that still shapes the 
contemporary political debate of Somalia (Lewis, 1972; Samatar, 1994). 
 As Makhubela (2010: 41) mentioned, General Siad Barre promised to the Somali people 
for two things, first, economic development and national unity through the ideology of 
“scientific socialism”, second, abolishing clanism and political Islam. He rather started 
militarization of the Somali society and imposed secularism,9 but later all his actions and 
activities proofed the opposite, such as disunity, injustices, clan nepotism and economic 
failure.  
1.3  Scope and objectives of the Study 
It is important to note that, this thesis neither appreciates nor criticizes the “Socialism” as 
a doctrine. The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the existing literature of the Somali state conflict, and mainly focuses on the economic 
and political impact of ‘Socialism’ on Somali Republic at the time.  
 In order to understand the main theoretical arguments of the topic, one should research 
the main arguments in the existing literature and critically analyze them within a 
                                                          
9 For details see Tadesse (2002: 16; Bradbury 1994: 9; Lewis 2005: 210) 
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theoretical framework. For that reason, this thesis mainly focuses on the ‘Socialist 
Somalia’ that existed in the years of 1969 to 1991.   
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the major impact of “Socialism”10 on the 
economy and politics of Somali Republic. This thesis also aims to descriptively analyze 
the relationship between “Socialism” and the economic and political problems in the 
country.    
This study also intends to fill the gap and create modest contribution in the existing 
literature by seeking an answer to the research questions raised in the subsequent part. To 
answer these research questions outlined in this study, subsequent answers is mentioned 
in the conclusion.  
My approach of this thesis is to survey the literature available in the field of political 
economy of “Socialism” in the field of Somali studies, and to highlight the economic and 
political impact of “Socialism” on post-independent Somalia. A special research focus is 
given to the ‘Socialist’ state era. 
As discussed previously, the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Based on the fact that, what 
mostly the Somali Scholars described as an era of chaos in the political economy 
dynamics of the Somali state. Many paradigms were mentioned on the causes and 
consequences of the state conflict of Somalia (Samatar, 1988; Lewis, 1972). 
According to literature of Somali state conflict, it has been highlighted many significant 
contributions of different problems including clanism, long colonization, lack of 
democratically elected civilian regime, and Socialism. To understand these problems, 
special attention is given the role of “Somali Scientific Socialism” on the economic 
disintegration and latter political crisis. Thus, this thesis then investigates, what was the 
major impact of “Socialism” on the economy and politics of the Somali Republic.   
                                                          
10 See the definition of so called “Somali Socialism” in page 1 
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Another objective of the Thesis is to contribute to the literature by analyzing the 
“Socialism” and its impact on the economy and politics of Somali Republic, one of 
Africa’s prime example and worst case of State collapse. It is worse than Rwanda, Congo 
and Liberia. (Lewis, 1994)11.   
1.4   Research Questions and Hypotheses  
In 1960, after almost a 100 years rule by European colonialists, the Somali Republic was 
shaped by a merger of Italian Somaliland in the south and British Somaliland in the north, 
two out of the five colonies existed in the Somali peninsula. However, the other three 
parts, Ogaaden12, French-Somaliland (present day Djibouti), and Northern Frontier 
District NFD (Northeastern Kenya), remained under alien rule. Since then, “socio-
political unification and socioeconomic development have turned into the focal issues to 
be tended by every Somali state” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:58).  
According to Abdi Ismail (2010), in 1960 the Somali Republic gained its independence 
with less expectations. At that time, Somalia was once described as Africa’s first 
democratic country (Samatar and Samatar, 2001). However, after almost 10 years, 
Somalia unrestrained its democracy and adopted an authoritarian one man rule, and at the 
same time autocrat manifestation of governance. The major objective of Siad Barre was 
to unite and bring all the Somali colonial territories under one flag, the ‘Greater Somalia’ 
ideology and self-reliance (Samatar, 1994). 
For Ahmed  Samatar (1994), regarding the consequences of the civil war in 1988; “almost 
5 million Somalis are being kept alive through emergency centers, 60% of Somalia’s 
basic infrastructure has been destroyed, 80 percent of all social services (e.g., schools and 
                                                          
11 See also  the report of Fund for Peace (2011) ‘Failed States index’ 
12 The term Ogaadeen refers to the Present day Somali Region of Ethiopia  
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hospitals) have been rendered non-operational; social and political institutions have been 
shattered” (Ahmed Samatar, 1994: 32). Moreover, Said Samatar noted, “a range of 
different answers has been suggested for the causes of the Somali agony, clanism, 
militaristic despotism, and super power strategic competition, has been mentioned” (Said 
Samatar, 2001). The reasons behind the state conflict were not limited to the 
aforementioned ones, my thesis at this point agrees with Abdi Ismail (2010), who believes 
that, the relevance of the Siad Barre’s adoption of “Scientific socialism”13 was proposed 
to legitimize his rule and answer to those who put him in power, more than it was directed 
towards Somali society (Abdi Ismail, 2010). 
This Thesis, while it is not disregarding the existence of those arguments, it concentrates 
more on finding the impact of “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” on the Somali economy and 
politics, especially during the military rule between 1969-1991, it tries to answer two 
major research questions:- 
1) How does “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” impact on the economy of the Somali 
Republic?  
2) How far does this ‘system’ also impact on other institutions, such as political 
institutions, social institutions and the military? 
How does “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” impact on the Economy of the Somali 
Republic?  
There has been a serious impact of “Barre’s Socialism” on the economy of the Somali 
republic soon after its inception in 197114 (see chapter 3 for details). The major impact 
will be analyzed on the subsequent chapter.  
                                                          
13 See the definition of ‘Barre’s Socialism’ in page 1 
14 This part of the analysis will be thoroughly discussed in the third chapter of the thesis which is the case 
study of Somali State conflict.  
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However, the USSR intervention was the most significant intervention of the history of 
Somalia, therefore, majority of the data used in this thesis is mostly related to the period 
when the military regime of Somalia was in power with the explicit support of the Soviet 
Union.  
The first research question consist of two parts, the first one is the ‘Somali Scientific 
Socialism’15 and the last part is about its major impact on the economy of the Somali 
state.  
To answer these two research questions, I have developed two hypotheses, which are 
subsequently represent different theoretical approaches.16 
The first approach is traditionalist approach 17 the oldest paradigm. The traditionalists 
like I. M. Lewis of the LSE argues “The ‘traditionalists’ argument which is a segmented 
clan system- remains the foundation of pastoral Somali society, and that ‘clannishness’ 
-the primacy of clan interests -has its natural divisive reflection on the political level”. 
(Lewis, 1961; Doornbos and Markakis, 1994)18. 
The second approach is the Instrumentalist approach, which I have used the definition of 
Brass (1985) which is “ethnicity as an instrument used by actors, groups or the ruling 
class (elite) in order to gain power and rule over others” (Brass, Paul 1985).  
In the Somali Case, Ahmed Samatar an Instrumentalist who had extensively studied the 
Somali military regime noted that “the Somali problem is not the clan reality and its 
                                                          
15 See the definition of “Somali Socialism” in page 1 
16 These two main theoretical approaches will be further discussed in the second chapter of the thesis. 
17 The Traditionalist Thesis comes from three important sources, which are, Historical Writings of the 
British travelers such as Richard Burton, the anthropological recordings such as Eran Prit-chard and the 
Ioan M. Lewis’s extensive writings of the Somali culture and tradition.  Apart from Richard Burton , the 
writings of the other colonial explorers include Ralph E., Drake Brokman, British Somaliland (London, 
1900), F. Adam, Hand Book of Somaliland (London , 1923). All of these contains narrations and personal 
recordings of the Somali Society and culture and they can be easily find in British Archives in London.   
18 For details, see  Lewis, I.M. (1961), A Pastoral Democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among 
the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, Oxford University Press, London; and Doornbos and 
Markakis,(1994) 
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culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class19 is the real ‘virus’ of the Somali 
case” (Ahmed Samatar, 1994:20). 
Hypothesis I: 
For the Somali state, the major economic and political institution problems, should be 
rooted from the implementation of the “Somali Scientific Socialism” ” experiment  
Hypothesis II: 
Soviet interventionists used Somali state as an instrument and this could be contributed 
to the Somali economic collapse and latter political crisis.  
 To answer these research questions a case study approach has been developed using 
Somalia as case study subject. The “Barre’s Socialism” experiment in Somalia in early 
1970s, it is consequences in Somalia, the 1969 military coup and the formation of 
“socialist state”, the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977, post-Socialist civil wars 1980-1991 
is also further analyzed. Consequently, the main arguments from different sources is 
analyzed in accordance with the theoretical background of the paper.  
1.5  Significance of the study  
As base of understanding the Somali state conflict, this thesis can assist as a useful 
resource for the Somali government, AU, UN and other members of development 
organizations who have a special interest of understanding the Somali state conflict, and 
who want to assess further by analyzing the causes of it.  
This Thesis can also contribute to government policy formulation on understanding the 
sociopolitical impact of a failed state.  Given a special attention to the “socialist state” 
era, this research would help fılling modestly the gap in the existing literature about the 
post-independent conflicts of Somalia. 
                                                          
19 In the Somali case, ruling class were mentioned as the ‘political leaders’ mainly from the clans who 
dominated leadership during the civilian and military regime.  
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 It is also a fundamental part of the consolidation of the Somali issue, which is a critical 
pillar of the AU foreign policy framework. This work as master thesis will modestly 
contribute to the body of knowledge on political economy of “Socialism” in Somalia. In 
addition, recommendations and suggestions given would be an important contribution to 
the Somali political, social and economic system, and will be discussed in a future study.  
1.6  The main argument of the Thesis  
As announced above, this thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
existing literature about the analysis of political economy of “Barre’ Scientific Socialism” 
in Somalia, and mainly focuses its impact on the economy and politics of the Somali state 
during the military rule. Recent literature suggests a multidimensional approaches of 
understanding the causes of state conflict in Somalia.  In order to understand the dynamics 
and the influences of “Socialism” in Somalia, one to look the literature.  Patman (1990) 
postulates that "pre-emptive measure to thwart endeavors by Somali reactionaries is to 
take power and capture dynamic reformers" (Patman, 1990: 42).  
 Firstly, in August 1968 there was an economic agreement between Moscow and the 
Somali government that allowed the Somali government to repay its superseded debts, 
he added by confirming that there was an incredible assistance towards the Somali 
Military regime by the Soviet union.  
As mentioned earlier, there are multidimensional approaches of understanding the causes 
of Somali State conflict, one of the most important argument is that, clanism, or inter-
clan politics initiated by misunderstanding and misinterpretation of “scientific socialism” 
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applied by the military regime is the real cause of the economic and political failure of 
the Somali state.20 
As Mukhubela (2010) noted “there are a number of additional reasons why mediation has 
become problematic since 1991: The colonial legacy, Barre’s repression, running for 
wealth and resources, clan rivalries, injustice and inequality, exclusion from power and 
wealth sharing, the economic decline under the Barre rule, the hyper-militarization of the 
Somali nation due to the abundance of weapons acquired during the years of conflict” 21 
(Makhubela, 2010:25). In this proposition, I argue to the point that, the issues were not 
just the previously mentioned ones, but bringing “Socialism” to a predominantly Muslim 
country were also a major factor. 
However, he assumes that Russia supplied a huge amount of economic and military aid 
to Somalia and directly encourages the execution of the military coup. After several year 
of a good relationship with the regime, the USSR reconsidered its position in the region 
and changed their mind. 
Nevertheless, Abdi Ismail (2010) argues, in the sense that USSR was unable to continue 
its direct support to Somali military junta due to certain reasons. Firstly, Somalis are 
predominantly Muslim, he noted “firstly, the deep presence of Islam in the Somali social 
fabric and the regime’s reluctance to aggressively address this issue was the main source 
of Soviet disappointment” (Abdi Ismail, 2010). However, it is argued in this thesis that, 
this was the main reasons behind the late disintegration of the Somali state, because, Islam 
and the “Scientific Socialism” of Siad Barre were NOT compatible.  
                                                          
20 See for example Patman, R.G. (1990), The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of 
Intervention and Disengagement Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
21 See also Osman, A. (2007). Cultural Diversity and Somali Conflict, Myth or Reality? Africa Journal on 
Conflict Resolution, 7.2: 93 – 134. 
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According to Lewis (2005) “When Siad Barre came in power in 1969, he pronounced 
that his “Scientific Socialism” is completely compatible with the Somali Islamic value 
system, even though his deeds soon proved the opposite” (Lewis 2005: 16). On the other 
hand, other sects such as Wahhabism were also began to compete for their followers 
among the Somalis, who had suffered from the consequences of the civil war in the 1990s 
(Lewis 2008: 20).   
In this regard, Lewis (2008) mentioned, while discussing that religion and “Socialism” 
can’t be inclusive, according to him Soviet Union hypothesized two things:-  
By choosing “Barre’ Scientific Socialism” as a way of life for Somali people, the military 
regime put itself into unreliable position as far as religion was concerned: First of all, 
Moscow wanted to see a new Somalia based on Marxist-Leninist principles, which is free 
from religion. Secondly, the Somali people, on the other hand, believed that Islam had an 
indispensable role on their social and economic spheres of life and could not be excluded 
from it. Lewis (2008) argues “Somalis with the leadership of their religious leaders were 
resisted the modernization of the educational system (Lewis, 2008:23).  
My thesis argues that, since Siad Barre himself does not  have the basic knowledge of 
socialist principles, never understood Marxism-Leninism, it was a bad choice to 
implement those policies blindly on a newly born state which was only 9 years old after 
its independence. 
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1.7 Research Methods and Type of Data  
This part of the thesis presents the methods used to collect, present and analyse the data. 
The research approach used in this Thesis is deductive research approach with case study 
method, since most of the data I used in this Thesis is like the form of journals, books, 
academic papers, reports and online publications consulted in the form of qualitative 
manner. Descriptive analytical approach mainly discusses on the course of the project 
results.  It stands applicable in all stages of research problems, starting from the beginning 
of the thesis to the construction of arguments on the issues in the research.  Moreover, in 
this thesis uses secondary data to clearly understand the theory and practice of the 
political economy of “Socialism” in Somalia, and its impact on the Economy and politics 
of the Somali regime.   
1.8 Research Strategy  
A case study is defined as “…the mode of generalization…that is previously studied 
theory is tested to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 2009: 28). 
Therefore the main research strategy of this thesis is Case study method to deeply 
investigate the impact of ‘socialism’ on the Somali economy and political institutions. 
The reason behind this approach is that, case study “extracts detailed information of the 
contemporary issues and situation on the ground by using varieties of ways of 
information” (Berg, 2001: 222). Case study approach also tries to understand the 
contextual conditions of the [state] within the regional structure. The logic behind the 
case study is helping to demonstrate an argument and how to shape and produce results, 
it is a way of addressing the research objectives (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 5).  
The Instrumentalist theory of the state is tested based on the data collected for the case 
study of the paper. The following figure outlines the research strategy: 
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Figure 1: Deductive Research Strategy 
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According to Ahmed Samatar (1988), “in spite of the fact that, the available evidence 
does not support the idea that Moscow orchestrated the October coup, it assures that a 
“coincidence of interest” existed between Siad Barre and Soviet Union’s strategic 
objectives”(Samatar, 1988:32). 
Chapter three is a case study presentation which is focused on mainly the impact of 
“Socialism” on Somali economy and politics. A short background of the Somali State is 
given based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two.  
In this regard, special attention is given to the “birth” of a “Socialist state” and the 1969 
coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre and its impact on the economy and politics of 
Somalia at the time, which continues to ravage the country for almost quarter of a century. 
Mostly in this chapter, the major economic data analysis is carried out.  
Furthermore, the 1977 Ogaaden war or the war with Ethiopia (a turning point of 
Somalia’s military regime) and one of the main post-socialist wars is studied 
conceptually. It is also argued that the conflict of the Somali state was triggered by the 
irredentist pan–Somali nationalism of Siad Barre’s regime as well as by what Somalis 
viewed as capitulation in the 1977 war over the Ogaaden with Ethiopia (Makhubela, 
2010). Chapter four and the last chapter of the thesis is suggested as summary and 
conclusion of the thesis,  it follows critical evaluation of preceding chapters’ findings , it 
focuses more on highlighting the main theories studied, and looking whether the research 
questions of the thesis has been answered. 
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 The conclusion part focuses on the recommendations concerning the theoretical 
approach to the understanding of the political economy of “socialism” by the Somali 
military regime and how it has legitimized and implemented.  
 
 Based on the overall findings as well as recommendations about the political economy 
of Somali military regime and the role of the “Socialism” on the state conflict, the 
hypothesis will be tested whether it is supported by the findings of the data analyzed. This 
thesis seeks to deconstruct the main purpose of understanding the Somali conflict in post-
independent era. Particular attention is paid to the consequences of it on the economy and 
internal politics of the Somali State. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAME WORK 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The major objective of this thesis is to understand the Somali state conflict, particularly 
the major impact of “socialism” on the economy and politics of the Somali Republic 
existed from 1969 to 1991. In this part of the thesis, theories on state conflict is reviewed 
in order to justify the main objectives of doing this research paper. First, the two major 
theoretical approaches on Somali state conflict is studied i.e. instrumentalists and 
traditionalists paradigm. Secondly, the most crucial and important part of instrumentalists 
theory of the state is explained and the hypotheses is developed based on this theory. 
Thirdly, the background causes of the Somali state conflict is explained in three phases; 
the first phase: pre-colonial period; the second phase: colonialism period and the third 
phase socialist state era.  
2.2 Two major theoretical approaches on Somali State Conflict  
In this section of the thesis, I will explain the two major theoretical arguments on the 
Somali state conflict. According to Abdi Ismail (2010), there are always two major 
prototype for the Somali conflict, these are classified as traditionalists and 
instrumentalists school. The first view, the traditionalist view, is led by Ioan M. Lewis, a 
British anthropologist who extensively studied the Somali nomads during the colonial 
period in 1940 and 50s.  The Scholars of the traditionalist thesis argue that, “the continuity 
of clan politics had destroyed the state” (Lewis, 1993, 1994; Said Samatar, 1991; and 
Simons, 1995). As mentioned, the traditionalists’ paradigm is that “the segmented 
clanism among the Somali societies remains their foundation of pastoralist culture, and 
that ‘clannishness’ – the primacy of the clan interest- is its natural divisive reflection on 
the political level” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 19).  
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The other school, the instrumentalist thesis, Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar are the 
forth runners of this school. Ahmed Samatar argues that, “the Somali problem is not the 
clan reality and its culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the real ‘virus’ 
of the Somali case” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:19).  
As mentioned, in this part of the thesis, I will review the two major debates about the 
Somali state conflict, the traditionalist and the instrumentalist schools of Somali studies. 
Theoretically, the two schools deeply analyze the political economy explanations of the 
state collapse.  
The post-colonial Somalia has been a subject of academic treatise like their peers in 
Africa for the last fifty years (Mohamoud, 2006)22.  In this background, Ellis argues that 
“the body of literature on the state in Africa is derived from political theory rather than 
from close observation of African history or society" (Ellis, 1996:2). 
According to Mohamoud (2006), the instrumentalist writers emphasized more on the 
impact of external actors rather than internal dynamics while addressing the problems of 
the Somali state. In addition to that, they have also focused on the state class which they 
have blamed for internal disintegration of Somalia.   
In the following section of the theory part of the thesis, I will discuss the traditionalist 
approach of the Somali studies.  
 
 
 
                                                          
22 For details of this account, see Doorknobs (1990) The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect 
and Prospect, Journal of Modern African Studies, 28 no. 2179-198; and Goran H. (1996) , Rethinking 
Theories of the State: An Africanist Perspective, Africa Insight 26 no. 1 26-35. 
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2.2.1 Traditionalists approach of Somali Studies  
The traditionalist debate of the Somali studies is generated from three important writings. 
First, the historical writings of the British explorers, such as Richard Burton,23 secondly, 
the anthropological recordings of I.M Lewis and Evans- Pritchard, thirdly, the 
modernization theories noted earlier.  
Richard Burton an English explorer who had extensively written about the cultural, social 
and political institutions of the Somali people at the time. Apart from Richard Burton, 
there were also few Arab travelers/explores24. However, I.M Lewis, an English 
anthropologist comprehensively studied the Somali people and their culture. He himself 
justified his study and noted “my romantic ambition to go and study [the] Somali 
nomads” (Mohamoud, 2006: 38; Lewis, 1994:2) 
Lewis published numerous works on Somali traditional system, such as kinship and 
clanism structure.25 Lewis lied down the traditional foundation of the Somali studies.  
According to Lewis (1961), the Somali social structure is a pastoral nomadism, and I 
quoted long, he argues:  
 “ ..the Somali pastoral nomads has the following key characteristics. First, 
the Somalis are highly egalitarian because off the absence of exploitation and 
domination in their power relations. Second, the Somali society is stateless, 
lacking centralized institutions and formalized authority. Third, the primary 
                                                          
23 See Richard Burton (1856) 
24 For details of other writings see Ralph E and Drake Brockman (1912), see also Collings (1975) Ibn 
Batuta in Black Africa: Selections, by Said Hamdun and Noel King, London UK.  
25 This publications of I. M Lewis  include, see I.M Lewis, People of the Horn Africa: Somali Afar and 
Saho   (London ,International African Institute , 1955/1969) ; Sufism in Somaliland : A study on tribal 
Islam (Bulletin of the SOAS XVII 581- 602; XVIII, 146-60 (1955-6); ;Modern Political Movements in 
Somaliland, (International African Institute, Memorandum xxx, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); 
A General Introduction to basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions (Somaliland: Hargeisa, 1957); 
The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa", Journal of African History. I (1960:213-30); "clanship and 
Contract in Northern Somaliland", Africa, xxix (1959:274-293). As we can see most of this studies were 
about the Somali nomadic system. 
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social networks of the Somali people is regulated by a web of lineage 
segmentation, which provides the fundamental basis for identity-formation” 
(Lewis, 1961: ibid)26. 
Even in contemporary era, this clan fragmentation shapes the political system of the 
Somali society. Therefore, lineage and clan segmentation became the central thesis of the 
traditionalist paradigm of the Somali Studies.27 Since then, after Lewis’s treatise, many 
studies had been fit to his thesis.  In this case, David Laitin and Said Samatar wrote:  
"For years the eminent European anthropologists Enrico Cerulli and I. M. Lewis 
have been telling us that to understand Somali politics, it is necessary to 
understand Somali clanship and kinship ties... The political history of 
independent clear. One can scarcely think of a significant domestic or foreign 
development in Somali politics since independence that was not influenced to a 
large degree by an underlying clan consideration” (David Laitin and Samatar, 
S., 1987: 155). 
For the traditionalist school, clanism is the central point of the Somali political economy 
discourse. They therefore noted that the clan is the major source of economic and political 
problem of the Somali society. After the state collapsed in 1991, their ‘oriented socio 
cultural thesis’ was proclaimed (Mohamoud, 2006). 
According to Lewis (1994), the collapse of the state is the reaffirmation of the high 
influence of the segmentary clanism and lineage system in the Somali Politics. However, 
Lewis summarizes:   
“…..Given then, that like nationalism, clanship is a human invention, is it in the 
1990s basically the same phenomenon that it was in the 1890s? Linguistically the 
answer must be "yes", since the same terminology has been employed throughout 
                                                          
26 See also Mohamoud (2006)  
27 See also Said Samatar, (1991) Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil (London: Minority Rights Group, UK 
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the recorded history of the Somalis. Sociologically, the evidence also supports this 
view. Indeed, the argument of this book is that clanship is and was essentially a 
multipurpose, culturally constructed resource of compelling power because of its 
ostensibly inherent character "bred in the bone" and running "in the blood", as 
Somalis conceptualize it” (Lewis,1994: 233). 
Many scholars followed the footsteps of Lewis, and many studies had been published 
based on the traditionalist endorsement.28 Therefore, the traditionalist scholarship of 
Somali Studies is a ‘nutshell’ (Mohamoud, 2006). In the following section, I would also 
like to review the other school i.e. the instrumentalist school of Somali studies.   
2.2.2 Instrumentalists approach of Somali Studies  
The instrumentalist paradigm of Somali Studies became a major challenge to 
traditionalist scholarship in 1980s onwards. This school is pioneered by the two 
prominent Somali Scholars, Ahmed and Abdi Samatar. According to Mohamoud (2006), 
the instrumentalist scholars were influenced by “the dependency discourse”. In several 
research publication they argue: 
"We suggest that the materialist literature more accurately depicts both the 
general global milieu within which Africa's submerged classes continue to 
struggle,, and the nature and role of the post-colonial state" (Samatar and 
Samatar 1987:673). 
Ahmed Samatar explained the tools which are critical to the Somali political economy 
and emphasized more on historical changes and the material production as well as 
transformation of the Somali people both socially and economically. In his Book, The 
State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, he further explained:  
                                                          
28 See for example the work of Virginia Luling "Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State", in 
Third World Quarterly 18, no.2 (1997): 287-300.  
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“This paradigm concerns itself with the production and accumulation, distribution 
off economic surplus, social reproduction, political arrangements and the 
impingement of the global order" (Ahmed Samatar 1989:8). 
The Instrumentalist scholars mostly focus on external actors in the contemporary 
economic and political making of the Somali people. Therefore, the researchers of this 
school further go in too deep discussion on the global market economy and imposition of 
colonial administrators. So before they start challenging the major content and outline of 
their paradigm, they tried to challenge the epistemological outline of the traditionalist 
approach. They claim, their analysis of the Somali case is outdated. In this case, Abdi 
Samatar postulates his argument:  
"The first task in this effort is to deconstruct the ghettoization of Somali studies 
as a backwater area in African studies. In spite of the revolutionary theoretical 
advances in the latter field in the last twenty years, which was stimulated by the 
crisis of peripheral capitalist development in the continent, Somali studies seem 
marooned to the earlier phases of modernization theory. It is therefore high time 
that the theoretical and methodological innovation in the study of African 
underdevelopment penetrate and inform the Somali condition" (Abdi Samatar 
1989:4).  
In addition, the instrumentalist scholars attacked the traditionalist scholars claiming they 
don’t have the specificity and by confusing the concepts of tribalism, nomadism and the 
state in the process of social formation of the Somali people. Abdi Samatar (1992) argues 
that “the instrumentalist proponents of their thesis is guided by history and specificity” 
(Abdi Samatar, 1992). In their analysis they argue that, the social and political 
transformation of the Somali did not remain static, it has been changing over time.  
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However, they have mentioned there are important analyses on this case. First, the 
imperial invasion, second, the commercialization of its pastoral production, and thirdly, 
the creation of a centralized state.  
Ahmed Samatar himself argues that traditionalist scholars confuse the kinship with 
clanism. He further noted:  
"Kinship denotes a central relationship buttressed by both blood-ties and deeply 
revered tradition and custom (xeer) - one which mediates among individuals or 
groups. This is part of the dominant ideology in some pre-capitalist social 
formations. Clanism on the other hand, is the transformation of kinship by 
detaching blood-ties from tradition and custom. This bifurcation results from the 
forceful intrusion of an alien type of social and economic organization and its 
concomitant norms and values" (Ahmed Samatar, 1989:8). 
Finally, the instrumentalist scholars argue that, the political transformation of the Somali 
people for over hundred years, has the major result of Somali disintegration. They have 
classified Somalis as different strata i.e. pastoral producers, merchants, bourgeoisie and 
intelligentsia. The instrumentalist scholars reaffirm that like their peers in traditionalist 
school, in Somalia there are social rivalry between the social strata that hampered the 
development of the country.  
To be more specific, they argue that “[the] internal tussles of the ruling state class, the 
petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, over power and appropriation of the surplus 
produced by peasants and pastoral nomads which is the core of the problem in Somalia” 
(Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar 1987: 63-65). 29  
The instrumentalist scholars further argue that, the dominant class fraction are the one 
who perverse clan politics as an instrument for their personal interest.   
                                                          
29 For details of this, see Samatar, Ahmed I. (1987), “Somalia’s Impasse: State Power and Dissident 
Politics", Third World Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 871-890. 
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Although they don’t usually put Somalia under classification of Classical Marxism, they 
propose that the class conflict is the major reason behind the state collapse.30 
2.2.3 The Soviet’s instrumentalist Foreign Strategy on Somalia  
The Soviets and Somalians changed reciprocal visits since President Sharmake’s visit to 
Moscow. It has been reported that Soviet defense Minister Marashal Ghrechko visited 
Somalia on February 13, 1972 with an invitation from the Somali Officials. He left 
Mogadishu after a week of official visit. Somali Vice president and the defense minister 
Gen. Mohamed Ali Samatar arrived Moscow on July the same year. There were no 
official statements released after these two meetings31.  
Gorodnov etal (1972), contended that by rationalizing the Soviet Assistance to Somalia. 
They wrote “Kismayo32 was built by the Americans … who left behind and ill memory 
of themselves  ... to this day rusting metals and smashed trestles stand as a mute reproach 
of American aid” (Gordonov etal, 1972). 33 
In the eyes of the soviets, Somalia prior 1969 was the land of corruption. As E. Sherr 
argued that “before the events of October 1969, power was in the hand of the rich elite, 
and corruption among government officials was a characteristic feature of political life in 
that period”34 . After 1969, the transformation of Somali polity has been welcomed by 
the Kremlin. However, Sherr (1974) contends that “Somalia’s Policy of non-alignment 
and neutrality became more principled and consistent after the revolution”.  
                                                          
30 See Abdi Samatar, (1999) An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in 
Botswana Development,  Portsmouth: Heinemann,  
31 Pravda, July 12, 1972 ; Pravda , July 18, 1972  
32 A port in Southern Somalia  
33 See details, Gordonov etal (1972), “In the Somali Democratic Republic”, international Affairs, 
Moscow, no 5, pp 105.  
34 E. Sherr (1974), Somalia : Socialist orientation , International Affairs , Moscow , no.2 , p.84 
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Had the Soviet Union used Somalia as an instrument to maintain its presence in the 
region? What was the major agenda of Soviet Union in Somalia?  
To answer this questions, I would like to look the historical importance and the Somalia’s 
geostrategic position.  Throughout its history, Somalia had been a geostrategic place for 
foreign powers. During the European Colonialism, Britain and Italy relied on military 
force to consolidate their respective positions in Somalia. Likewise, in 1962 the Soviet 
Russia started got interested the Somali intervention and  granted US$32 million loan to 
modernize and equip the Somali army, it also increase its military presence to 14,000 
personnel. Moscow later increased the amount to US$55 million. There was always a 
geostrategic interest for the Soviet Union’s cold war objectives, seeking to counter United 
States influence in the Horn of Africa. In my thesis, I argue that, Soviet Union used 
Somalia not as “socialist apparatus” in the horn of Africa, but also a geostrategic location 
to advance their presence and influence in the region.  
In late 1960s, the Soviet Union provided Somalia with T-34 tanks, armored personnel 
carriers, MiG-15 and 17 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. It has been estimated 
around 300 Soviet military advisers deployed to Somalia to train Somali army, and about 
500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Russia. 
Therefore, there was an argument mentioned that, Soviet Union orchestrated both the 
military coup and the assassination of Civilian President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke.  
After the coup, however, Siad Barre embraced “Scientific Socialism” and the Soviet 
Union became Somalia's major supplier of military materiel. 
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For almost eight years, the military relationship between Somalia and USSR prospered. 
In early, 1972. As mentioned, the Defense Minister Andrei Grechko visited Somalia and 
signed an agreement to modernize and build the port of Berbera in return for Soviet access 
to the facility.  
They eventually built Berbera into a military base that included a missile storage facility 
for the Soviet navy, an airfield with runways nearly 5,000 meters long and capable of 
handling large bombers, and extensive radar and communications facilities. This constant 
access to Berbera port gave the Soviet Union a presence in the strategically important 
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region to counter United States military activities in the Horn 
Africa.  
Table 1: Foreign aid to Somalia 1960-1970 
Source  Financial Grants 
(Millions of SoSh) 
Financial Loans 
(Millions of SoSh) 
Total 
Italy 171 150.5 321.5 
U.S.S.R 4.3 316.4 320.7 
U.S.A 109.4 12 121.4 
U.N 85.5 - 85.5 
E.E.C 18 - 18 
Czechoslovakia - 25.7 25.7 
Others  7.5 - 7.5 
Total 395.7 504.6 900.3 
Source: Lewis (1967) 
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In addition, Sofinksy (1974) argues that “the decision to take socialist orientation 
logically led the adoption of scientific “socialism” as the ideological basis of the SRC of 
Somalia …Somalia “has become an outpost in the struggle for the national liberation of 
social emancipation on the African continent, and one of the most progressive states in 
Africa.”35 
The Soviets has increased their aid and investment in Somalia after October 1969 coup. 
In 1974, Soviets built several factories in Somalia, including meat factory in Mogadishu, 
a deep sea port in Berbera and Fish Plant in Lasqorey.  Moscow used Somali state as 
instruments to develop their regional political objectives, they claimed that they 
developed Somalia as young Socialist state in the Horn of Africa.  
In the eyes of Soviets, the October socialist revolution was to build Somalia as free from 
the “exploitation of man by man.” 36 
With this background, the first hypothesis is stated: 
 
 
2.3 Collier and the theory of State Building  
In this section of this the thesis, I will review the Collier’s theory of state conflict. State 
failure is wide concept for political scientists. It created a fast range of academic 
discussions for the last decades. However, there is no consensus among scholars on the 
definition of state failure.  
For Rotberg (2004), he classified human and non-human factors as causes of the state 
failure. He argues that some researchers even highlighted accidental factors as the major 
                                                          
35 See Sofinsky (1974) 
36 V. Shemrov  (1974), “New Stage in Soviet Somali Relations : New Times, Moscow , no. 29 , pp 23-24  
Soviet interventionists used Somali state as an instrument and this could be 
contributed to the Somali state conflict. 
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causes of state failure. In his analysis, he concluded that “human agency” should be 
blamed for the problem.  
Paul Collier mostly studied the academic field of state building. In his Book Bottom 
Billion Countries, he did a rich quantitative analysis on some least developed countries. 
He had described one billion people in poor countries where no economic development 
is imaginable. He noted “The real challenge of development is that there is a group of 
countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling apart” (Collier, 2008:3). 
Collier (2008) further analyzed and advocated for international intervention to stabilize 
state, he wrote: 
“… an intervention which this year permanently alleviates the poverty of one 
thousand people in China is simply less valuable than an intervention with the 
same effect in the Democratic Republic of Congo, not because Chinese people 
should be less valued than the Congolese but because the prospects for the 
Chinese are manifestly more promising.” (Collier et al., 2008:10). 
In my thesis, I disagree with Collier (2009) claiming that “the involvement of 
international community is crucial for function states to emerge in the bottom billion 
countries”. He also justifies a military intervention as a state stabilization. In contrast to 
Collier’s thesis, Robert Jackson argued that “in post-colonial period, all African states 
were quasi states” not fully functioning states for that matter (Jackson, 1990). 
Collier (2009) argues that “in the bottom billion countries” where there is no mechanism 
of accountability in place, the losing party should accept defeat.  
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Therefore, Collier (ibid) stipulates those countries that their governments became too 
corrupt to give basic goods such as water, shelter and education, and he defined this as 
poverty trap with conflict trap. In a report published with other scholars Braking the 
conflict trap (2003).  They have summarized:   
“War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double 
causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles… When development fails, 
countries are at a high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war 
wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war.” (Collier etal, 2003:1). 
2.4 Background of the Somali State conflict  
In this section of theory part of the thesis, I will very briefly review the major background 
of the Somali state conflict from pre-colonial period to state collapse in 1991.  
2.4.1 Phase I: Pre-colonial period (pre- 1897) 
Pre-colonial Somalis were under ‘stateless’ situation (Mohamoud, 2006). No formal 
institutions or polity existed, but the social order was maintained through moral and social 
cohesion among the Somali nomads at the time. I hereby used the definition of 
statelessness as “a society of rules without rulers or order without government” (Hussein 
Adam and A. Mazrui, 1997). Pre-colonial Somalis like other societies in Africa, tried to 
create a viable and stable social and political system, but there was no any formal 
government (Ellis, 1999).  
The literature on Somali politics and economic studies is mainly dominated by both 
Somali-born and non-Somali scholars, such as Lewis (1961, 1965, 1964, 1972, 1967, 
1982, 1994, 1999, 2002, & 2008), Samatar and Abdi, I (1989, 1987, 1988, 1994, 1997), 
Menkhaus (2004 and 2003), Adam (2008; 1997, 1998), Bradbury, M (1994), Samatar, S.S 
(1993, 1997). 
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According to Osman (2008), the literature about the causes of the Somali State conflict is 
indeterminate, he argues “despite this human catastrophe and suffering, the literature on 
the causes of Somalia’s conflict remains inconclusive”. The conflict has been explained 
as lack of governance and bad leadership (Samatar 1993; Samatar 1994; Hashim 1997), 
from the problems of running for wealth and power (Kusow 1994; Mukhtar & Kusow 
1993; Besteman 1999; Lee Casanelli and Besteman 1996) or from bad economic policy 
and lack of sound developmental policies (Osman, 2007; Mubarak, 1996).  
Other studies postulated the Somali conflict as “continuing from stone age ancestral clan 
rivalries, but using ‘Star wars military’ violence” (Besteman 1999:4). 
2.4.2 Phase II: Colonialism period (1897-1960)  
The last quarter of the nineteenth century there has been different systems which shown 
political developments that transformed the Somali peninsula. During this period, the 
Somalis became under a number of “state systems” with the flags of France, Italy, Egypt, 
Britain, and Ethiopia. The new colonial rulers in the Somali peninsula had different 
motives for their colonization. Britain wan to gain control of the northern Somali coast as 
a strategic source of beef supplies or other products for its naval port in Aden (present day 
Yemen). Some authors noted, the British occupation of the northern Somali region began 
in February 1884, when a British military major by the name Hunter arrived at Berbera in 
Somaliland to negotiate and sign treaties of friendship with some Somaliland clan elders. 
He has arranged to have British vice representatives installed in Bulahar, Berbera and 
Sayla’ in the North of Somalia (present day unrecognized state Somaliland)37.  
Similarly, Bradbury M. (1997), argues that, foreign strategic interest was also a major 
motive since Somali has always been in good commercial space, due to its location. In 
1839 the British colony established a battalion of its troops in Aden to safeguard and 
                                                          
37 for details, see Somalia : Country Studies, US Library of Congress  
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control its trade route with far India. In the 1880s three European colonies Britain, France 
and Italy signed different treaties with Somali elders for their influence in the region.  
In addition to that, Bradbury argues that, the Somali partition by the European colonizers 
has been widely consolidated, he wrote “by the year of 1900 the Somali territory was under 
the division in treaties between France, Italy, Britain and Abyssinia38 (Bradbury, 1997). 
These colonial intrusions left a legacy of a system of a centralized government mixed onto 
an un-centralized political system of a pastoral society. My thesis at this points argues that, 
the colonial system of Somalia created a complex division among clans, same as 
Socialism. In this regard, Bradbury (1997) also argues that, the colonial treaties which 
divided the land of the Somali people created borders which did not respect clan territories, 
for example the Haud grazing lands39 surrendered to Ethiopia by Britain in 1954 
(Bradbury, M. 1997)40.  
Somali people are pastoralist society in nature, so this division of their land and isolation 
of pastoral lands restricted the mobility of pastoralists during the seasonal movements, 
leaving the more vulnerable ones to the whims of inhospitable climate. The allocation of 
pasture and water rights to certain lineages created problems of clan and territorial identity, 
and upset others for the inequality between clans. Then, State development changed the 
way people would like to participate in the local management of resources such as pasture 
and water for their animals.  
Bradbury Mark (1997) argues that:  
“…as new forms of wealth accumulated in the state, the mandate of political 
leadership altered from regulating kin relations and entitlements to pastoral 
resources, to regulating access to the political and economic benefits of the 
                                                          
38 Abyssinia: the term refers to present day Ethiopia   
39 Haud: refers to present day Somali region of Ethiopia  
40 See also Lewis (1988)  
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state, thus sowing seeds of disunity and conflict. One response of the colonial 
government to such conflicts was to invest more in state security. Hence, 
colonial state formation established an urban bias in development that 
marginalized the rural pastoral and agro-pastoral populations” (Mark 
Bradbury, 1997:5). 
2.4.3 Phase III: Socialist State period (1969- 1991).  
In this section I will review the general situation of the Somali state during the socialist 
regime. Most of the economic analyses will be further discussed in the third chapter of 
the thesis. I argue from this point that, Somalia’s economic system was drifted from 
mixed economy (colonial system) to centralized (Socialist System) under the military 
dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power in October 1969. 
The first charter of the Somali regime empathized more on the central role of the state in 
society, it assured to every Somali person has the right to work, to get social justice, good 
participation in national development and an it should end to clan nepotism under the 
supervision of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).  In 1976 the Somali 
Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) has mobilized a national program, such as a 1972-
74 campaign to eradicate illiteracy, a program which is participated by the high school 
students to teach their fellow nomads. 
 Barre vowed that, the intention was to turn the Somali nomads into a modern and 
developed socialist state, to which he claimed people could prosper and look for 
development and leadership, and welfare instead of clan. He embodied to the nation that 
he was the president and ‘aabaha Qaranka’ (father of the Somali nation), Barre. 
(Bradbury, M. 1997; Ahmed Samatar, 1985). 
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According to Abdi Samatar (1985), Scientific Socialism's attack on the culture of the 
Somali people was directly linked with authoritarian and state control of the whole 
economy.  
Although the government's so called policy was to decentralize state authority, and to 
enable participation for all in development, all state structures were controlled by the state 
authority. In this case, Barre controlled all formal government institutions.  
Ahmed Samatar (1988) noted that Barre vowed, it is their duty as talented leaders to work 
for their fellowmen with justice and dignity. Barre said in his speech:  
“One of the major principles in “Socialism” says that, under the socialistic 
regime it is the privilege and duty of the strong and talented leaders to use their 
superior force and richer endowments in the service of their fellow-men without 
distinction of class, nation, or greed” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: 148). 
Unfortunately, what happened in the Somali Republic at the time, was completely the 
opposite. Therefore, my thesis argues that, both colonialism and “socialism” were not a 
good experiments in Somalia. Moreover, “Socialism” aggravated many social, political 
and economic crisis in Somalia right from dictatorship to disintegration. In this matter, I 
argue perhaps another way e.g. Arab-style “Socialism” would have been suitable.  
When the Horn of Africa became an important geostrategic location during the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, the colonial powers started coming in and secured along territory 
in the long coasts of Somalia. British colony established their protectorate of British 
Somaliland in 1887 in the north (British Somaliland), then paralleled by the establishment 
of the protectorate of French Somaliland later in 1885, and finally Italian colony settled in 
the  southern shores in 1889  (Samatar and David Laitin,  1987).41  
 
                                                          
41 For details see Samatar, S. etal (1987) Somalia: Nations in search of a state, See also  Dominik 
Balthasar (2012)  
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All the Somali inhabited territories has been divided among European powers, the 
Ethiopian empire at the time also took over the Somali-inhabited Ogaaden 42 , while 
Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya became British colonial mosaic, the Somali 
people found themselves in a five different powers at the end of 19th century (Balthasar, 
D. 2012; Samatar, S. 1993). 
 According to Ismail, Ahmed et al (1999), the nomadic pastoralism was the major 
livelihood of the Somali people in the Somali peninsula. Before the European invasion in 
the middle of the 19th century, there were massive migration of Somali people into 
different areas, where non Somalis were originally populated.  
 My analysis at this point tries to forward different arguments about the root cause of the 
Somali State Conflict, special study is given the political and economic impact of 
“socialism” on Somali Republic.    
The Somali political and social structure mostly consist of clan families, subdivided into 
sub-clans43. The family members of each sub clan, which is basically called ‘dia’ paying 
group’44 have their internal tradition agreement to support each other and share certain 
payments of blood compensation. They have their own traditional leader called ‘elders’ 
and each sub clan has their own council of elders who have certain responsibilities.  
During the colonial period, all elders were under the payroll of the colonial office, they 
were the legitimate representatives of respective groups. During the emergency situation, 
each member of the ‘dia paying group’ act as an active member who have an obligation to 
help to each one  undergoing in a hardship circumstances during the crises. In the crisis 
                                                          
42 In this Thesis the word ‘Ogaadeen’ refers to the present day of the Somali Region of Ethiopia 
43 See Appendix Page 
44In this thesis, the term `dia-paying’ related to clan members who have collective responsibilities such as 
blood compensation and the like. 
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period, every member must be observed in a good character and must be helpful. 
According to Mubarak (1996), clan “is a ‘myth’ invented by outsiders” (Mubarak, 1996). 
According to Ismail Ahmed et al (1999), majority of the current studies or examinations 
of the socio-political crisis of the Somali people are based on as noted a misconceptions 
and theoretical generalizations  which is supposed that Somalis are socially unique at the 
same time culturally and linguistically homogenous society. Therefore, my thesis agrees 
to the point that, many analysts had failed to analyze properly by ignoring the complexities 
of the political reality of the Somalis, while mostly focusing on one- exploration of state 
conflict based on clanism and segmentation’. Ahmed Samatar (1999) argues that on the 
topic of clans and lineage structures, many scholars have raised clanship as the most 
dominant factor in the Somali contemporary political and social system. Therefore, 
understanding clan and lineage in the contemporary Somali politics, is not sufficient to 
understand their political and social structure. Many NGOs show charts as an illustration 
of Somali clan genealogy, thus this concept is superimposed on many factions, and this 
shows the disorder of the literature on Somali society when it comes to clan.  
While not rejecting the cases mentioned, my thesis argues, in order to understand the State 
conflict of Somalia, it is important to look beyond the clan issue. 
Agreeing to Adam, H.M (1994), the unification of the two Somali territories of the North 
(British Somaliland) and South (Italian Somaliland) was a major problem and this could 
be the root cause of the Somali Conflict. In his argument, he further noted:  
 “ the rapid union of the two Somali territories to form the `United’ Somali state 
in 1960 was a great challenge to the new government, because soon after 
independence, the Somalilanders (Northern Clans) became disillusioned with the 
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way the union was proceeding and indeed voted `No’ in the unification 
referendum” 45 (Adam, 1994: ibid). 
But I disagree with him at this point, because the main dream after independence was the 
unification of all Somali territories, not only South and North, but also the other regions 
which were under colonial rulers, including the Somali Region (Ethiopia) and NFD 
(Kenya) and French Somaliland (present day Djibouti). 
Adam (1994) also noted that the interest of unionization of the two Somali colonies while 
Somaliland initially (independent) accepted conditions demanded by southerners, 
moreover Mogadishu became the capital city and the center for the Somali parliament.  
In addition, the Southerners held all the major important posts of the government, plus a 
majority of the parliament seats. Therefore, because of the increasing discontent, southern 
leaders started to further marginalize their northern colleagues. 
From Socioeconomic point of view, the civilian government’s development program also 
failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socioeconomic problems 
in the north with the problems inherited from the colonial administration.  
Despite the integration of the two colonial systems, a serious corruption has been 
accredited to the public sector. However, the Somalilanders (clans in the north) were not 
the only group suffered with the union. The Rehanwein clans from the two river region 
in Somalia, who had the same number of seats with Hawiye and Darod (the two other 
major clan families) in the south before unification of the Somali north and south, also 
became marginalized (Mukhtar, 1996) 
Abdi Ismail (2010) posits in the case of tribalism of Barre and noted “little success was 
gained on this front. By the mid-1970s, the resilience on tribalism in Somali politics was 
                                                          
45 For details see Adam (1994) Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born? In Collapsed States: The 
Disintegration and the Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Zartman (ed). Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
London UK 
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observable.…one suggestion is that Barre, though he had formally denounced tribalism, 
was carefully using clan balance as a mechanism for control” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:147). 
In addition to that argument, clan control was Barre’s political game after the military 
coup.  
I agree with Laitin and Samatar’s (1987) proposition that “from the early period of the 
revolution Siad [Barre] exhibited what some would call paranoia of the Majerten clan46. 
Barre re-legitimated the language of tribe in Somali Politics” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: ibid). As 
I have mentioned above, the traditionalist approach lies on the Somali clan support and its 
reflections of the Political Economy of the Somali conflict. 
 Makhubela (2010) surmises that Somalia has been a disintegrated country in terms of 
clans and sub clans since 1897 (Lewis, 1994 and 2003). Adam (2008) also has a point, in 
that during the post-colonial period, from 1960, (when Italian colony of Somalia and 
British Somaliland united and Somali Republic was formed), the issues of clan lineage 
and fragmentation “were further compounded.”   
Osman (2007) argues that “the Barre military regime became more clannish in character, 
dominated by the Darod sub-clans of Mareehan, Ogaaden and Dhulbahante” (Osman, 
2007: 37). Agreeing to Lewis, Makhubela (2010) conjectures:  
“Somalis have a common ancestry, a single language and belong to the Islamic 
faith (Sunni), yet they are one of the most divided people along clan lineage and 
patronage47. They are divided into six clan families – Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq, 
Digil, and Mirifle/Rahanweyne, which are further divided, according to agnatic 
descent into subsidiary clans of lineage groups” (Makhubela, 2010:37) 
                                                          
46 The Majeertens were the clan that held all the key positions of power during the civilian administrations.  
47 To understand Somali clans and sub clans, see the Clan Genealogy of the Somali people in the Appendix 
page.  
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At this Point, I agree with Bradbury M (1994), in that clan structure is therefore a 
fundamental political unit essential for individual and group survival, particularly during 
conflict times. Menkhus (1995) discusses that most analyses of the prolonged civil conflict 
and state collapse of Somalia focuses on “flawed political leadership as the cause of 
Somalia's woes”.  
Many scholars blame the divisive tactics of Barre regime, he left a deep legacy of clan 
animosity on current political and social system in Somalia, which became the main 
obstacle to national reconciliation of the Somali people. Other analyses portrayed that “the 
Somali conflict as ‘continuing from Stone Age ancestral clan rivalries’, but using ‘Star 
wars military violence” (Besteman 1999:4). 
Although many studies suggest that, clan conflicts or ethnicity based politics somehow 
affected the Somali State failure over decades, however, some scholars have questioned 
the validity of this paradigm. In those scholars, Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar wrote: 
“…..in general, the primary motive of a political leader is to keep themselves in 
power and consequently in doing so has to answer to those that keep them in 
power. For the Somali civilian leaders to win the conflict over influential positions, 
the state and leadership survival gradually became the most important tasks for 
the majority of the Somali elite. There were, however, some notable exceptions” 
(Abdi Ismail, 2010: ibid). 
Table 2: Elite Structure, Legitimacy and State building in Somalia 1960-90  
Source: Abdi Samatar (1997) 
Regime Elite 
unity 
Conscious 
leaders 
Legitimacy Clarity of 
strategy 
Institution 
building 
1960-64 High Low High No No 
1964-67 Low High /low High Yes/no Yes 
1967-69 low Low High/low No No 
1969-77 high Low High Yes/no No 
1977-90 Low Low Low No No 
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As Abdi Samatar (1984) noted, there was only one short period that the Somali 
government encouraged to build formal institutions. As Table 2 shows, all post-colonial 
Somali governments, except for the civil regime 1964-1967 never intend to build any 
formal institutions.  
Post-colonial Somali administrations, were hysterical about encouraging efficient formal 
institutions. They have realized that building any efficient institutions does not serve their 
own personal interests, therefore, they have formulated alternative strategies for their own 
survival. Their shortsightedness and bad strategies undermined the state formal 
institutions, and their poor leadership put the Somali state in to conflict trap. 
As I noted earlier, in 1969 a military junta assassinated the president and closed down the 
parliament. The constitution was abolished, and General Siad Barre became dictator.  
Shortly after taking power, Barre announced that his system would eliminate tribalism, 
corruption, nepotism, misrule, and injustice, he vowed all this goals would be sustained 
through the application of “Socialism” principles in the country, however “socialism” was 
abandoned in 1980 after the Russians halted the military assistance of Somalia.  
The Neoliberalist policies after Socialist system failure : from Socialism to 
IMF-ISM 
 During the 1980s liberalization had started in Somalia, the country was promised as 
Somalia was intervened by IMF with US aid. In 1970s and 80s, with the regardless of the 
former declared economic system, Barre focused on resource extraction for the benefit of 
his allies. Besteman (1996) confirmed that “although Barre had outlawed the use of any 
terminology referring to the clans, he illegally gave land and water rights to specific clans 
that supported his rule” (Besteman, 1996a: 126). 
The first constitution of 1960 guaranteed both the unity of the two Somali former colonies 
and democracy, it also sanctioned form of ‘multipartyism’ with freedom of expression. 
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There were some significant political differences that encouraged a creation of parties to 
the point where Somalia became a country having more parties than “any other democratic 
country” except the state of Israel (Besteman, 1996).  
According Laitin and Samatar, S. (1987), the country’s last elections held in March 1969, 
almost 60 parties competed, but little civil governance existed and service delivery was 
very poor. Because of that background that the military coup became successful, and Barre 
took power in 1969.  
Lewis (1994), also comparing the situation mentioned by Laitin and Samatar, he noted:   
“Taking his place among Africa’s `big men’, Barre immediately suspended the 
country’s constitution and banned all forms of political and professional 
association, `promising to cure all of the country’s ills”.  He also decreed in the 
following year the adoption of Scientific Socialism, an ideology that was (he 
claimed) `fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society” 
(Lewis 1994: 221). 
With the famous slogan of “socialism” unites, tribalism divides”, clan was officially 
prohibited and the regime promised to eliminate any written or verbal of clan or clanship 
form. They have outlawed the tradition of blood compensation between clans, Barre 
introduced the death penalty for those convicted murder. My thesis, at this point argues, 
bringing a “socialism” to a society which are predominantly nomadic was a bigger 
mistake, however, sweeping political and legal changes were also introduced in the first 
years of the military rule. They have established a repressive security apparatus who report 
directly to Siad Barre himself. Countless propaganda campaigns were launched such as 
songs poems of praise, posters and speeches. He proclaimed himself as the nations’ hero, 
‘father’ of a nation whose ‘mother’ was the revolution’ (Lewis, 1994:152).  
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Barre’s political propaganda machinery was misleading the international community. 
Some international observers confused his rhetoric with reality on the ground.  
In the first years of his rule, almost all the sectors of the economy were brought under state 
ownership.  
A wave of nationalization programs were launched to all medium and large scale 
businesses, such as banks, schools, and insurance companies. Many new state-owned 
institutions were became pure monopolies absolute monopolies which also became the 
foundation for the socialist economy. 
A law has been passed that prohibits private traders to import, store or supply any food 
items. In this regard, Ismail Ahmed etal (1999) noted “It became increasingly clear that 
nomads and agro pastoralists, including wealthy nomads and farmers who owned large 
herds, were to be treated as ‘lumpen proletariat’ …..the government found nomads largely 
uncooperative” (Ismail, Ahmed etal 1999:36). 
For Bradbury M. (1997), while emphasizing more on the economic impact of “Socialism” 
on Somali Republic, he wrote:  
“The centralization of political and economic power in the Somali state reached 
its zenith under the military dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre, who 
seized power in October 1969. Within a year the military coup was turned into a 
'bloodless revolution'. 'Scientific Socialism' was adopted as the ideological 
framework for the country's future development (Mark Bradbury, 1997:6)  
Bradbury continues, that “Siad Barre believed weary of the debilitating effects of 
'clanism',……with the shift from a pastoral society to a modern nation state, the urban 
intelligentsia and technocrats initially was backed in this programme” (Mark Bradbury, 
1997: ibid).  
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My thesis at this point briefs that, Mohamed Siad Barre seized power through the armed 
military. He build a strange security structures to stay in power, rather than investing the 
socioeconomic institutions of the country. In this process, Barre neglected the social 
services sector like Education and health, and a few budget was allocated to this sectors.48 
Samatar (1985) argues, Somalia became highly militarized, he mentioned the Somali 
military was one of the highly invested institution.  
In 1980 the security sector absorbed nearly 75% of government budget, it also consumed 
half what is earned from the country’s export (Samatar, 1988). In 1974-75: a prolonged 
famine called (Abaartii Dabadheere) in the local language hit the North West regions.  
The socialist experiment, the political hostility of the clan in that area, turned the 1974-75 
drought into one of Africa’s worst droughts which resulted the death of over 20,000 people 
in the north. 10-15% of the pastoralists were settled in the refugee camps.49 
Food shortages was severe in the northern regions. The nationalization program and 
government monopoly with the introduction of price controls seriously interrupted food 
markets. The Arabian-Somaliland- Ethiopian trade corridor, has been closed down and 
tight control of Berbera port was implemented.50 
When the laissez-faire system was replaced by centralized Socialist system, failure of the 
food system had emerged. Hundreds of government owned shops were opened in the 
towns. Residents in the areas were given special ID Cards to buy food, but few people 
managed to buy the sufficient food needed in these shops. In rural areas, those who don’t 
have IDs mostly relied on food purchased on the black market with excessive prices 
(Mukhtar, 1999).  
                                                          
48 For details of this stage, see Chapter three: Case study presentation 
49 See for example Hussein etal (1987), Agricultural and non-agricultural settlements for drought-
afflicted pastoralists in Somalia’, Disasters, 11(1), pp 30-39; and G Haaland & W Keddeman (1984), 
Poverty analysis: the case of rural Somalia’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 32(4), pp 843-
860. 
50 ibid 
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Because of an extensive crop failure and wide spread food shortage in Ethiopia also 
contributed to the problem in the region. The level of the drought was severe, almost five 
million animals died in Somalia/Somaliland which resulted serious consequences on the 
economy in both Somaliland and the neighboring Haud of the Somali region of Ethiopia51. 
Although the problem of the drought reached every corner throughout Somalia, the rural 
nomads had never recovered from this natural disaster. The Socialist government pursued 
and objective of converting nomadic pastoralists to farmers without proper training, it 
started a resettlement experiment and transferred over 100,000 nomadic pastoralists from 
refugee camps in Somaliland (North) arable lands of southern Somalia.52  
Although pastoralists denied for the first place, but they were forcibly coerced to their new 
host environment.53 In 1960 Somali government started its militarization programs during 
border clashes with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, thus this increased further in 1970s 
and 80s with the interest of superpowers in the Horn of Africa such as USSR and USA. 
With the Soviet’s finance, Somali Republic established the highest powerful army in sub-
Saharan Africa (Samatar, 1988). In this regard, my thesis argues, considering himself as 
powerful and highly militarized state, with this force,  
Barre took Somalia into a war with neighboring Ethiopia to capture the Somali inhabited 
region of Ogaadeen. Somalia badly defeated in this war soon after USSR aligned with 
Ethiopia. However, Somalia secured US$ l00 million a year in military aid from US, to 
use Berbera port policing the Gulf (Bradbury, 1997).  
According to Zegeye et al (1997), Somalia got the highest military support from USSR, 
in their analysis they wrote:  
                                                          
51 The term refers to Somali region of Ethiopia. 
52 I argue at this point, this was a major drawback and consistent failure from the regime.  
53 ibid 
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“The regime was highly successful in obtaining military support. Somalia was one 
of the most heavily militarized states in Africa and one of the top recipients of US 
and Soviet military aid during the Cold War. Moreover, more than 80% of refugee 
aid, which in 1986 together with other non-military aid accounted for 25% of GNP, 
was diverted to the army”54 (See table 3). 
Table 3 : Somalia: Percentage GDP allocated for Military, Health, Education and 
respective ratios (1969-1978) 
Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988) 
In contrast to Zegeye et al (1997), Professor Ahmed Samatar, in his book, Socialist 
Somalia55: Rhetoric or reality, agrees the level of soviet militarization of the Somali 
regime. In 1969 after the revolution USSR-Somali relation had come to a new stage.  
The USSR has been supporting the Somali Republic with military and development 
support (Abdi Ismail, 2010; Sofinsky, 1974). 
                                                          
54 For details see Zegeye etal (1997), `State disintegration and human rights in Africa’, International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology, 38(1/2) pp 64-86. 
55 In this paper, the term “Socialist Somalia” is used only during the period when the communist party 
was ruling Somalia 1969-1991. 
  % GDP  Ratio per thousand population  
Year  Military  Health Education Armed forces  Physicians  Teachers  
1969 5.1 1.9 1.7 6.7 0 0.7 
1970 5.9 1.8 1.8 7.1 0 0.7 
1971 5.7 1.5 1.7 6.9 0.1 0.7 
1972 6.2 1.8 2.4 8.6 - 1 
1973 6.3 - 2.6 8.3 0.1 1.3 
1974 7.5 2 3.5 9.7 0.1 1.6 
1975 6.6 1.9 4.2 9.4 - 1.6 
1976 6.5 1.8 4.6 9.7 0.1 2.5 
1977 7.3 2.2 5.4 16.1 - 3 
1978 13.8 2 5.7 16 0.2 - 
 49 
 
As shown in table 2, Samatar (1988), argues that any significance dimension of human 
rights is the level of militarization of political life, in given society genuine self-reliance 
demands a conscious effort to reduce militarism, a requirement that is especially relevant 
in poor country like Somalia. The question arises as discussed by Samatar, whether the 
SRC which is later was named SRSP 56 has ever exposed an intention to demilitarize the 
political economy at some point.  
According to him, he noted “the Somali military regime absorbed a large segment of 
country’s revenue, a less favor has been given to the crucial areas such as education and 
health sector”. In this thesis, I argue that, their major purpose was to show the level or the 
degree of militarism in the country.  In this matter, I argue with that, Somalia, a poor 
country which had the lowest per capita income of the World had spent such huge amount 
of money for armament and defense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP): the only party created in June 1976 and voted to establish 
the Supreme Council as the new party's central committee. 
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CHAPTER III:  CASE STUDY: SOMALI STATE CONFLICT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to give a brief background information about the creation of the 
military regime and the birth of a ‘socialist state’ in Somalia.  In this study it mainly 
focuses on the implications of the “Socialism” on the country. In this part of the thesis, I 
would mainly focus on analyzing some of the economic data of the Somali Republic from 
different sources to test the hypotheses raised in preceding chapter. There are three parts 
in this chapter. First, political economy of “socialism” in Somalia, in this, it mainly 
focuses on the impact of “socialism” on the economy such as agriculture and production, 
export and import sector, public and financial administration, and income distribution and 
social welfare. Second, the impact of “Socialism” on major institutions, it focuses on how 
“socialism” affects the country’s main institutions such as social institutions, political 
institutions, like SRSP, military and security forces. Third, the last part of the chapter 
emphasizes on “Socialism” and beyond, for example Somalia from ‘socialist state’ to 
failed state.  
To those people who might not know about Somalia, one Somali analyst put it as 
“prehistoric Somalia was the land of punt … a fable source of prosperous and luxury 
...where postmodern Somalia can be seen as “a prime example of collapsed state” and 
becoming another Somalia is the fate to be avoided by every African state” (Abdi Ismail, 
2010; Virginia Luling, 1997). 
As Mubarak (1996), surmises, when Somalia’s military coup leaders decided for 
“socialism” in 1970, the soviets had increased their military assistance to Somalia 
considerably.  
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Many Somalis believe that their military leaders chose “socialism” just only to lobby for 
military and financial support from USSR to move forward on their famous Pan-Somalist 
57 objective.  
It has been argued, no nation was willing to train the Somali military and provide modern 
weapons and armaments. Therefore, Somali military junta choose “socialist style 
economy” just to keep pursuing their major regional and long-term political objectives 
(Mubarak, 1996).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, chapter two, Somali military junta had come to 
power in 1969, overthrow the civilian regime and created a socialist state. As Abdi Ismail 
(2010) noted, the regime suspended all formal political institutions of democracy; the 
parliament, the constitution, the political parties and the Supreme Court were suspended. 
The Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC) has been announced as the single party 
responsible for all these institutions. Abdi added that “Barre with his wing in the SRC 
consolidated all power in his hands” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 88). 
After the SRC monopolized all formal democratic institutions, the major civilian 
politicians, Mohammed Hajji Ibrahim Egal (the prime minister) Abdirizak Hajji Hussein 
(Main rival of Egal) and Adam Abdullah Osman (the former President of the civilian 
regime), including some officers from the army were either imprisoned or put them under 
house arrest. Nearly all formal political institutions were suspended and political 
activities banned. All the activities and responsibilities of these institutions were put 
under SRC58.  
                                                          
57 Pan-Somalism was the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology based on uniting all the Somali territories under one 
flag. This dream has never been achieved.  
58 SRC: Somali Revolutionary Council, the supreme council of the military regime. 
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As Abdi Ismail (2010) wrote: “The council transformed the Somali Republic into the 
Somali Democratic Republic and promoted the military coup as a political revolution 
undertaken by an angry society led by its armed forces (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 88).  
I agree with an argument saying that, post-colonial Somalia had had only nine years of 
civilian rule. The 1969 coup by General Siad Barre and his counterparts as noted  “is a 
factor which most scholars associate with the modern day chaos in Somalia” (Tadesse 
2002: 19; Lewis 2008: 36; Makhubela, 2010: 20). 
Makhubela (2010) argues, “When Siad Barre seized in a military coup, he renamed the 
country the Somalia Democratic Republic, based on Scientific Socialism. This effectively 
affiliated the country with the Soviet Union in the Cold War” (Makhubela, 2010: 48).  
Siad Barre promised three things for his society: economic independency; unity ; and 
eliminating clan and its structures through the adoption of “Scientific Socialism” 
ideology, rather he suppressed the people, militarize them and imposed secularism 
(Tadesse 2002: 16; Bradbury 1994: 9; Lewis 2005; Makhubela, 2010:50). 
3.1.1 The impact of “Barre’s Socialism” on the Economy  
Somalia has been one of the poorest countries in the world since its independence in 1960.  
The Somali economy has three important distinct sectors: first, agriculture, which the 
main parts are livestock herding and agriculture59. This sector has the largest share in 
GDP and export, and it provides the means of support for millions of the Somali 
population; secondly, an urban sector mostly operated by the commercial class; and 
lastly, the service sector where mostly run by civil servants, ministries and 
parliamentarians (Laitin and Said Samatar, 1984; Abdi Ismail, 2010). 
 
                                                          
59 Mainly Livestock and Banana  
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My thesis at this point, argues whether the military regime inherited some kind of 
economic weakness from the civilian predecessor , this created considerable  questions 
among the scholars in the Somali literature, but it has been obvious, starting from the 
unification of the two Somali colonies60, both of them had different economic 
administrations. However, there are two different arguments, some scholars have argued 
that the country’s economy was devastated by the socialist regime, while others argued 
the Somali economy had experienced some improvements. Majority of them supported 
the first argument (Samatar 1993; Samatar 1994; Hashim 1997; Kusow 1994; Mukhtar 
& Kusow 1993; Besteman 1999; Lee Casanelli and Besteman 1996; Osman, 2007; 
Mubarak, 1996).In my thesis, especially in this chapter, I would like to compare these 
two arguments and provide solid theoretical arguments by using some macroeconomic 
data studied by those scholars.  
First let us see the major distinctive sector, i.e. agriculture which shares the highest 
contribution to the GDP and export, and it also provides the basic livelihood for millions 
of Somalis living in rural areas.  
3.1.1.1 Agriculture and Production  
As I noted before, there are two different arguments between scholars, regarding the 
economic Development during the socialist regime. Some have argued that the country’s 
economy was devastated, and few of them said the economy had experienced some 
improvements. In this regard, Abdi Ismail (2010), noted, “by adopting scientific 
“socialism” to build new socialist Somalia and granting required military facilities from 
the soviets, Barre secured Soviet’s economic and military support” (Abdi Ismail, 
2010:117).  
 
                                                          
60 British Somaliland in the North and Italian Somalia in the South  
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As discussed, SRC61 somehow persuaded to Somali people that the adoption of  
Scientific “Socialism” is the best and the only way they can prosper and became an 
advanced state.  
First of all, to understand the discussion, it has been noted that, there is an argument 
among scholars for analyzing the status of the economy during the military and socialist 
regime. According to Abdi Ismail (2010) a Somali Scholar and Economist at the 
University of Helsinki, “there is a consensus among the existing studies that in the first 
years of the revolution until 1975, for the first three years of the coup, the government 
established a development plan” (see table 4 below). 
Table 4: Investment in three-year Development Program 1971-73 by sector 
(Millions of Somali Shillings)62 
Source: Abdi Ismail (2010)  
As noted before, although the Somali regime inherited some economic problems from its 
civilian predecessor, then to overcome those problems, they had implemented a sound 
plan to smooth the economy, priority was given to the main sectors like agriculture and 
livestock. 
                                                          
61Supreme Revolutionary Council: Somali leaders were never tested or studied the principles of 
socialism. According to Abdi Ismail (2010), General Siad Barre himself knew nothing about Marxism-
Leninism before the coup (David Laitin and Samatar, S., 19; Abdi Ismail, 2010). Barre and his Junta 
members, for them state ideology has three main components: - Barre’s ideas of community 
Development, Scientific Socialism, and Islam (Abdi Ismail, 2010) 
62 1971 constant prices 
Sector  Investment  % of Total  
Rural     
Livestock  51 7.8 
Forestry and ranges  5 0.8 
Agriculture and Irrigation  83.2 12.7 
Fishery  4.5 0.7 
Rural Water Supply  64.2 9.7 
Subtotal  207.9 31.7 
Industry  117.5 17.8 
Government Services  331.4 50.5 
Total  656.8 100 
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As shown in Table 4 the priority has not been given the productive sector of the economy 
which constitutes the largest share of the country’s GDP. A small amount of investment 
has been designed for Livestock (7.8%), Agriculture (12.7%), while the government 
services sector has been given almost 50% of the investment.  The socialist regime spend 
more investment on government services including military. In my argument, I would 
say that it has been deviated from its own plan.  
Another Development Program has been established for the following years. As shown 
in Table 4 the agricultural sector investment has increased to almost 30% when you 
compare to the previous plan in Table 3 which was only 12.7%, but this doesn’t 
guaranteed any sectoral development, at the same time , it has not guaranteed the 
sufficiency and independent economy that was promised by the socialist state, see (table 
5).  
Table 5: Investment in the five year Development program, 1974-78 by sector 
(Millions Somali Shillings) 
Sector  Investment  % of Total  
Livestock  162.1 4.2 
Agriculture and Irrigation  1124.5 29.1 
Forestry  51.1 1.3 
Fishery  78 2 
Water resources  139.5 3.6 
Mining  45.7 1.2 
Electricity  136.5 3.5 
Industry  588.3 15.2 
Transport and communication 944.7 24.5 
Education 191.1 4.9 
Health  77.7 2 
Housing 158 4.1 
Labor  11.3 0.3 
Statistics  106.1 2.8 
Tourism  12.6 0.3 
information 37.1 1 
Total 3702.2 100 
Source: Abdi Ismail (2010), see also Samatar (1988) 
If we closely look the economic performance of the Socialist military of Somalia in its 
first phase period 1969-1975, it has been said that the economy was performing well. But 
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I disagree, as shown in Table 5, the agriculture including the livestock (the most important 
sector in the Somali economy) has been neglected and the situation was devastating. Of 
course, figures shows that agriculture has grown by less than 0%, it experienced negative 
growth, and the services sector including defense, became the dominant sector in the 
Somali economy. Table 6 and 7 summarizes the country’s economic situation in this 
period. 
Table 6: Growth and Production 
Average annual growth rate (%) 
GDP  Agriculture  Industry  Gvt. Services  
1960-
1970 
1970-
1976 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1976 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1976 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1976 
1.0 2.1 -1.5 -1.2 3.3 -10.3 2.1 8.0 
Source: World Bank Development Report (1978) 
Table 7:  Structure of production 
Distribution of Growth Domestic Product (%) 
Agriculture  Industry  Gov. Services63    
1960 1976 1960 1976 1960 1976   
41 31 17 8 38 61   
Source: World Bank Development Report (1978) 
3.1.1.2   Export and Import  
Although some scholars argue that the economy under Barre improved when you 
compare to its predecessor, in this Study, I argue that Siad Barre did not succeeded in his 
Socialist based economy in Somalia. As shown in Table 7, the military coup cannot be 
said professional, and the revolutionary goal of making Somalia self-sufficient in food 
has not been achieved, plus Siad Barre failed to reduce the foreign dependency in trade 
which the trade deficit has increased from Sshl 87.9 million in 1967 to Sshl 352 million 
in 1973 (see table 8 and 9). 
 
                                                          
63 Government services (mainly defense and administration) 
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Table 8: Food Imports (Millions of Somali Shillings) 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Imports of         
Rice  20.6 19.9 26.3 26.5 104.864 24.3 57.5 
Cereals  14.7 15.3 22. 5 24 15.6 10.1 13.3 
Total  35.3 35.2 26.3 50.5 120.4 64.4 70.8 
     Source: Laitin D. (1976) 
Table 9: Foreign dependency and trade deficit (Millions of Somali Shillings)65 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Imports  286.4 339.8 369.8 322.2 447.6 523.9 646.2 
Exports  198.5 212 231.9 223.9 264.4 298.4 294.2 
Trade deficit  87.9 127.8 137.9 98.3 183.2 225.5 352 
Source: Laitin D. (1976) 
As table 8 and 9 depicts, little success has been made in attaining economic independence, 
even during the worst year of 1971 season, the worst year of the drought, Somali people 
relied on foreign food.  
Figure 2: Somalia: GDP, Import and Export Growth rate % (1971-1990) 
 
                                                          
64 Due to prolonged drought, the import of Rice has increased.  
65 See also UN Economic for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data : Somalia (Addis Ababa), compiled 
1975, pp 10-16 
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Moreover, trade deficits have been increasing at a level considerable greater than 
inflation. According to Laitin (1976), Barre has not succeeded in his socialist based 
economy, he noted “Siad Barre has not reduced dependency on foreign aid, rather he has 
changed the country on whom Somalis are dependent to foreign aid and debt” (Laitin, 
1976:25). 
Figure 3: Somalia: External Debt (in Millions of USD) 1971-1990 
 
According to Samatar (1988), in the first years most of the studies were affirmative and 
confirmatory. From 1969-1979, the literature falls on of two categories; either inline 
which continues to affirm the righteousness of the endeavor, or a less enthusiastic, more 
critical trend.66 However, my thesis at this point agrees with Samatar (1988), that the 
regime’s record was very poor and falls short of the goals initially planned.   
The performance of the Somali economy was disastrous. As I said earlier, the rural sector, 
the largest part of the economy was neglected. Production of almost all major food crops 
                                                          
66In details see the works of David Laitin (1976), p. 468  and I.M. Lewis (1979), pp.14-43  
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declined, this created that the country have to rely on food aid with extremely heavy 
loans. 
As noted, although the number of state enterprises has increased but the production was 
negative, this contributed to the declining the value added per worker, due to lack of 
skilled labor, a low capacity utilization, a high tax burden ( almost 80%  of net profit) and 
rising prices of imported inputs. (See table 10) 
Table 10: Estimates of GDP at Factor Cost, 1972-1978 (1978 constant prices)  
Item  Million   
1972  
Million  
1978 
% of  
Total 1978 
Average % of 
Annual 
Growth  
Production Services  4405 4675 72.0 +1.0 
Rural Sector  3775 4675 62.5 +1.2 
Livestock 2820 3265 50.3 -2.5 
Agriculture  670 490 7.5 -5.0 
Other  285 305 4.7 +1.0 
Industrial  630 615 9.5 -0.5 
Services Sector  1225 1820 28.0 +6.5 
Govt. services 350 570 8.8 +8.5 
Other  905 1250 19.2 +5.5 
Total GDP( at factor cost) 5660 6495 100.0 +2.5 
Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)  
Table 10 depicts, how devastating the economy was, there was such low and mostly 
negative growth, another important implication shown in this table is that the great 
expansion of the government services sector, particularly defense. The country’s 
economy during this period was extremely weak and poor in comparison with the 
neighboring countries, such as Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Rwanda. 
As discussed by Ahmed Samatar (1988) quoting London’s Overseas Development 
Council. He noted: 
“Somalia had the lowest GNP, the lowest physical quality of life index, the lowest 
per capita public education expenditure, the highest infant mortality per 1,000 
live births and the highest per capita military expenditure” (Ahmed Samatar. 
1988:148) 
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It has been argued by Samatar (1988), that the other crucial spheres of internal 
reconstruction, i.e. politics and human rights, the overall results have also been at 
variance with self-reliance.  
For example, despite the nationalization of some important segments of the Somali 
Economy, especially the modern sector, there was very few evidences of a genuine 
democratization of the workplace. The military government prohibited strikes and death 
penalty was implemented against offenders.  
 Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC) were appointed as the decision unit of all executive 
decision, in that case, he added “when Siad Barre eliminated all his rivalries, he became 
the supreme authority–law giver, judge and executor” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: ibid). In 
this regard, my thesis at this point agrees with Samatar that the regime’s political position 
was less democratic, there were no constitutional limitations on the power of central 
government and the president.  
Another important discussion about the Economy of Somalia in 1970s lies on the 
production stagnation of the pastoral sub-sector (livestock and agriculture).  
As already mentioned, the situation of the production and livestock export was effected 
drastically. In 1983 livestock exports declined by 30% from those in 1971-72, moreover, 
there have been no improvements in the marketing of pastoral production (Samatar, 
1988). 
Although there was no complete data available at the time, Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues 
that, a measure of this condition can be seen from the huge food imports and aid delivered 
to Somalia in 1984-1985. In 1984 only, 70,000 tons of food were bought and 230,000 
tons were given as food aid; in 1985, the import figure was 92,000 tons with another 
270,000 in aid.  
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Table 11 shows both the languidness and of domestic production and the continuing 
dependence on imports for food grains, especially in the face of an alarming rate of 
production growth, nearly 30% per year.  
Table 11: Domestic production and Imports as percent of the total grain availability 
(1979-1983) 
Year Domestic Production 
(000 tons) 
Imports 
(000 tons) 
Import as % of marketed grain supply 
1979 262 150 37 
1980 168 241 47 
1981 383 271 41 
1982 405 155 28 
1983 358 168 32 
 Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)  
Here the analysis goes to discussion about the chronic stagnation of Somali agriculture. 
This table summarizes how the rural economy due to the acute of shortage of crucial 
technical ingredients, inputs and investment funds had created an absolute failure of the 
Somali economy. Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues that, the rural production has remained 
far from healthy. Somali industrial performance in the mid-1980s was even more 
regrettable. 
 He further noted “for example real output per capita despite an investment allocation of 
about 15% in the 1982-1986 plan, did not improve”.  My thesis argues that, even though 
the regime’s adopted socialist economy failed, the regime continued to pour large amount 
national resources in to the most unproductive sphere, defense and general 
administration. Table 12 shows the disadvantages of the economic and social services. 
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Table 12: Selected items as percentage of ordinary state expenditure (1981-1984)67 
Item  11981-82 1983 1984 
General Public Services  51.2 47.3 45.2 
Defense and Security  30.5 32.6 36.3 
Social Services  11.7 11.7 10.5 
Economic Services    6.7   8.3   8.0 
Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)  
The contraction of country’s production, excessive unwise spending by the socialist 
regime, “and acute of deficiencies in implementation and management have contributed 
to create a harrowing economic condition on the Somali society. In addition, the cost of 
imports has [quadrupled], Somalia’s Balance of payment has worsened” (Ahmed 
Samatar, 1987) (See table 13). 
Table 13: Somalia: Balance of Payments (Millions of US dollars) 
Items 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Exports  133 144 137 100   58 
Imports  -461 -442 -484 -450 -408 
Trade Balance  -328 -298 -347 -350 -350 
 Source: World Bank (1985), p 17.  
As shown above in table 5, the regime established a development program aimed to create 
financial independency, self-sufficient and increased production, but by the end of the 
plan period most objectives were unattained. In the industrial sector; the consolidation 
and maximization of efficiency and productivity; creation of new industrial units in fields 
vital to the national economy; and the encouragement of the private sector to play a 
secondary role in industrial growth were the main targets.  
As Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues, in 1978 a number of significant projects (70% 
financed by foreign companies) had been established in Somali Republic.  
                                                          
67 For details see also World Bank Confidential Report (1985), p. 85 
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These factories included the Match and Cigarette factories, fruit and vegetable canning 
plants, a wheat flour and pasta factory. Table 14 shows the downward trend and the 
stagnation in key industrial products in 1971-72.  
Table 14: Somalia: Industrial output of selected Products68 
Item  Unit of Measure 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Sugar thousands of tons 30 33 30 24 21 20.9 
Canned Milk  millions of tins 14 10 9 - 1.5 1.2 
Milk millions of liters 2 4 4 3.31 2.7 2 
Pasta and Flour millions of tons 8 8 8 8.1 5.8 4.3 
Canned Fruits and Vegetables  thousands of tons 1 2 1 0.9 1 0.9 
Textiles millions of yards 6 7 13 13.8 9.93 9 
Boxes and Bags  thousands of tons 5 7 5 4.75 5.2 4.5 
Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988) 
It has been argued that the problems of industrial sector were not limited to that fall of 
productivity. There was a massive decline of the value add (-12.5 % per year 1970-1980) 
and the profitability was affected too especially per employment.  
Among the serious problems of the Industrial sector were: 
1. Underutilization of industrial capacity  
2. In adequate financial incentives for employees, where the average salary per 
employees declined 50%. 
3. Lack of Managerial Staff and skilled workers. 
4. High taxes, interest burden, and non-payment by the state for goods and services.  
3.1.1.3  Financial and Public Administration  
As I have noted, during the socialist regime the country’s export severely affected. The 
revenue from the export was less and cost of import was over 8 times higher than the 
revenue from export.   
                                                          
68 For details see also Somalia: Central Bank of Somalia (1979). pp. 12-19 
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This further effected, the ordinary budget of the government, this caused the budget 
balance to deteriorate over time, from a surplus equivalent to an average of 1.2 percent 
of the GDP in the early 1970s to deficit equal 6.5 percent of the GDP in late 1987.  
Table 15: Central Government’s Current Budget 
  Average  
1970-75 
Average 
 1981-83 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
(Millions of Somali Shillings) 
Revenue 521 2,994 3,774 5,220 9595 10,018 
Expenditure -476 -4,086 -6,663 -7,910 -12,765 -21,021 
Balance 45 -1,092 -2,889 -2,690 -3,170 -11,00369 
(% of GDP) 
Revenue 16.1 10.4 6.1 6.0 8.0 5.9 
Expenditure -14.9 -14.2 -10.7 -9.1 -10.7 -12.4 
Balance 1.2 -3.8 -4.6 -3.1 -2.7 -6.4 
Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988) 
As table 15 shows, in 1987 the revenue was half of the government’s expenditure, the 
deficit was larger than the government revenue. High inflation rate, the severe 
devaluations of the Somali Shilling and rise of consumer price index were the main 
problems faced by the Somali economy in 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69 The deficit larger than the government revenue  
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Figure 4: Somalia Percapita GNP 1973 -1990 
Source: adopted from Abdi Ismail (2010) 
In 1970, Siad Barre mobilized all means of power under his command to centralize state 
power in his hands. However, this creates mess both in the economy and politics of the 
country. Barre promised to develop the economy; reduce in equality and establish self-
sufficient economy, but none of these objectives had never attained.  
Barre created strategies to ensure the survival of his military regime. First, he formulated 
a “patrimonial system to recruited and promote his clansmen in to the public offices” 
(Abdi Ismail, 2010). The government institutions were converted to clan institutions, 
therefore, all government high ranking officials (the ministers and vice ministers) was 
appointed by Barre with his clansmen. (Abdi Ismail, 2010).   
According to Abdi Ismail (2010), the government ministries became under the property 
of certain clan property, even some of them didn’t know the address of the ministry unless 
they are collecting diplomatic Passports or their tickets. 
The other major drawback of the public employment was that, Barre’s regime ignored 
the worsening situation of the public employment sector. In 1975, expenditure per 
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employee decreased from over 23 thousand shillings to only a little over 5.5 thousand 
shillings almost 76% decline in 1989. Table (16) shows the misery situation of the public 
employment sector.  
Table 16: Central Government non-defense Expenditure (per Employee, Somalia, 
selected years, 1975-89) 
Year Expenditure 
(Millions) 
Employment Expenditure per 
employee 
1975 476.0 20,600.0 23,107.0 
1979 700.0 35,000.0 19,971.0 
1981 269.0 40,000.0 6,721.0 
1989 314.0 56,500.0 5,558.0 
Source: Abdi Ismail (2010) 
Another deficiency was the major mismanagement of the government expenditure 
targets. Table 17 shows the periodic budget of 1984 to 1988, the table summarizes that 
almost all of the government budget was absorbed by the General Services including 
army. In 1988, 94.4% of the government budget was absorbed by the General services. 
50% of the budget expenditure was allocated to finance central services including 
Barres’s palace, the Villa Somalia. It was tragic that the economic sector received only 
2.39 % of the total government expenditure. Social services such as Education, health 
and Labor received just 3.12%. 
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Figure 5: Ordinary Budget: Foreign Affairs and Finance & Services 
 
Source: Adopted from Mubarak (1996) 
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Somalia in its early year of independence at least by theory was dependent on Italy. Laitin 
(1976) wrote “ in 1961, that country accounted for 43.1% of Somalia’s aggregate trade, 
but a diversification happened throughout the civilian era , and by 1969 that percentage 
had dropped to 29.3% . Somalia‘s export had dropped to 5.4%70. Moreover, Table 17 and 
18 shows how the country’s export suffered after 1969 revolution.  
Table 17: Somalia's Export before revolution (1960-1968) 
 
Table 18: Somalia's Export after 1969 revolutions
Source: World Bank (1980)
                                                          
70 See also UN statistical year book for international trade, 1960 and 1970-1971, New York. 
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Table 19: Somalia Ordinary Expenditure 1984-1988 
Source: Abdi Ismail (2010)
Expenditure  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 % of the Total  
1988 
Finance and Central Services  2,102.40 4,118.30 7,631.80 14,127.10 12,515.60 49.80 
Defense  1,785.80 1,750.90 2,511.00 2,999.70 7,917.60 31.50 
Interior and Police  223.60 307.80 443.40 560.70 715.40 2.85 
Foreign Affairs  219.90 427.20 632.20 1,413.90 2,153.10 8.57 
Justice and Religion Affairs  141.20 158.40 244.60 290.20 446.90 1.78 
Total General Services  4,472.90 6,762.60 11,463.00 19,391.60 23,748.60 94.50 
        
Transportations  53.10 55.90 60.70 87.50 94.50 0.38 
Post and Telecommunications  54.10 65.70 58.70 76.70 75.60 0.30 
Public works 38.80 47.60 48.90 57.50 69.80 0.28 
Agriculture  96.20 56.30 45.40 59.50 55.30 0.22 
Livestock and Forestry   56.40 74.80 83.20 89.50 109.90 0.44 
Minerals and Water resources  53.40 75.40 60.60 85.20 93.10 0.37 
Industry  7.10 7.00 10.90 45.10 43.90 0.17 
Commerce  4.40 5.80 11.00 na na na 
Fisheries  28.20 30.00 33.90 45.40 58.20 0.23 
Tourism  3.80 4.30 4.30 10.20 na na 
Total Economic Services  395.50 422.80 417.60 556.60 600.30 2.39 
 
Education 327.30 314.40 330.40 403.00 478.10 1.90 
Health  138.40 153.90 165.60 203.50 255.10 1.01 
Labor  22.70 21.30 17.10 21.10 51.80 0.21 
Total  Social Services  488.40 489.60 513.10 627.60 785.00 3.12 
       
Total Expenditure  5,356.80 7,675.00 12,393.70 20,575.80 25,133.90 100.01 
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3.2 The impact on major non-economic Institutions  
As Samatar (1988) surmises, all the issue of religion, clanism and political participation had 
to dealt with in the context of newly developed system of “socialism”. Abolition of clan was 
first addressed by Barre. All his speeches were marked clanism as an ‘evil’. As Samatar 
(1988), observe,   “a general ‘Campaign against Tribalism’ was launched from February to 
March of 1971” (Samatar, 1988: 149). As I have mentioned earlier the Blood compensation 
locally called ‘diya payment’ was abolished, the weddings and burials were to be held in 
municipalities.   
In this part, my thesis would focus on the socialist impact on major institutions of the Somali 
state at the time, including political institutions, culture and religious institutions. In this 
section, I will look into the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977, which was once said “the most 
turning point of the socialist regime of Somalia”.  
Somalis are 100% Muslim, therefore, “Socialism” confronted the national religion. In a long 
speech Barre, while mentioning the lack of any contradiction between Islam and 
“Socialism” he declared that: 
“....  Ours is the religion of common man. It stands for equality and justice, 
consequently, “Socialism” as applied to our particular condition cannot identify 
religion as the obstacles to the working class and therefore cannot negate it”71 
(Samatar, 1988: 156). 
                                                          
71  For details see David Laitin (1976) 
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Samatar (1988) noted, “the most explosives confrontations was that over 1974 Family Act”, 
the law states that women and men should have the same inheritance. Somali religious 
leaders rejected the law.                                                                                    
They have declared that their religious values had been attacked, and this act was imposing 
of secularism and bureaucratic invasion. Finally, many religious leaders were arrested, and 
in 1975 ten Somali Sheikhs (Religious Scholars) were executed in Mogadishu in a bright 
daylight after accusing them a counter revolutionary ideas.  In a speech Siad Barre said: 
“If both Islam and “Socialism” advocate, justice, equality and improvements 
people’s lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one 
another? What harm is there in having the faith of Islam, and at the same time 
applying “Socialism” as an economic and political system through which our 
country can make progress ? I would say none” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: ibid). 
 According to Samatar, not only the religious leaders were confronted, two Military 
generals72 from SRC were accused anti-revolution, as far as 200 other individuals were 
arrested with security sweep. The two generals were convicted in military tribunal and shot 
in public in July 1972. 
3.2.1 Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)73 
In the literature of “Somali Socialism”, scholars had noted that, in order to promote the 
concept of “Socialism” in Somalia, Moscow established a Marxist party, the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council (SRC), the higher council of the military regime became the most 
effective institution in the country to create a socialist state. In 1971, the major agenda of 
                                                          
72 Gen. Aynanshe  (Vice president) and Gen. Gabyare (Defense minister and member of SRC)  
73 Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was Marxist-Leninist party in theory, but their ideology was 
also included Islam and Pan-Somalism.  
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the Russian government is to create a Marxist party for the Somalis to govern themselves 
with socialist values.  
Soviets believed that General Siad Barre was their man in the Somali peninsula, they have 
trusted him, and they knew that only military support will not be enough.  
As Abdi Ismail (2010) noted, before the coup, several other socialist parties existed in 
Somalia: Hawl and Hanti wadaag (Labor and Socialism); The Greater Somali League; and 
Somali Democratic Union (SDU).  All of these parties were created with the help of Italian 
communists. Soon after the coup, almost all of them became advocates of “Socialism” (Abdi 
Ismail, 2010).  
According to Pestalozza (1974), General Gabyarre’s 74 group, were accused of seeking 
Islamic Socialism, and perhaps that is why USSR sought their execution. However, when 
Russians failed to convince to the Somali regime that their system will work with the Islamic 
religion. In 1973, Somali regime admitted that there is some pragmatism in the Somali 
socialism, and they have concluded the Islamic religion would be upheld in their daily life 
(Abdi Ismail, 2010). It has been argued, although the main agenda of SRSP was to 
decentralize the Somali politics, the working guideline of the party was just an ideal.  Figure 
4 shows the formal structure of the authority in Somalia in 1976.  
As shown in figure 6, the leadership, military administration, budgets and program, and 
highest profile positions were all under the president control and were subject upon his 
approval. During those years, many scholars concluded that Somalia was one of the highest 
military dominated states in Africa.  
Ahmed Samatar (1988), in his study Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric or reality, argues that, there 
were four criteria was mentioned in the literature of Somali Military studies: prevalence of 
                                                          
74 The Defense Minister and member of SRC  
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martial law; monopolization of key power positons by the military; legal system based on 
military courts; and tight relations between military and police forces (Ahmed Samatar, 
1988).  
He further noted “Somalia should be classified as a highly repressive state, including [the 
usage of] torture and brutality” (Sivard, 1982: 17)75. Most of its revenue has been absorbed 
by the military and less has been diverted to the basic social services like education and 
health services (See table 2).  
Figure 6: Somalia: Formal Authority Structure (1976) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Ahmed Samatar (1988) 
3.2.2 Somali-Ethiopian War: the turning point of the 
Somali Socialist Regime 
In the literature of the Somali studies, it has been argued that, in 1977 the ruling Class of 
Somalia and Ethiopia plunged into what one scholar called “the most ferocious [conflict] in 
Africa since World War II” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988). In this thesis, I would also like to give 
a brief overview about the effect of this war on Somali Republic. Although my study does 
                                                          
75 For details see , Ruth Leger Sivard (1982) , p.17 or Ahmed Samatar (1988) ,p. 113 
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not contradict the existing facts about the war, I argue that, the war had very serious 
consequences on Somali political economy.    
Mubarak (1996) argues, when the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted in 1974, 
Ethiopia fell into tragic civil war and political turmoil was started.   
Ethiopian Military leaders were trying to establish ties with the east, in that case the Somali 
regime wanted get advantage of the weakness and confusion existed in Ethiopia, and 
therefore they claimed to free the occupied land in the Ogaadeen (Haud Region). The Somali 
government started war with neighboring Ethiopia in 1977, as Mubarak noted “when the 
Somali armed force upheld the Somali separatist groups battling in the Ogaaden” (Mubarak, 
1996).  The war had also increased the expenditure on armament (See figure 7). 
Figure 7: Somalia Army Imports 1971-1988 
 
  Source: Adopted from Mubarak (1996) 
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The Ogaaden war has been interpreted by some as the single most important turning point 
for the regime (Lewis, 1994).76 At the beginning of the conflict, many people ethnically 
Somalis were fled to Somaliland (North). In 1979 almost 1.3 million refugees were present 
in Somalia.77 Half of them have been settled in Somaliland (North).  
This has increased the tension between locals and refugees, hatred and animosity started as 
Isaaq (the major clan in the north) became the second class citizens in their own localities.  
Tension were spurred as government started enrolling refugees in to the armed forces. As 
noted, the failed war with Ethiopia obliviously undermined the credibility of the Somali 
military, Lewis (1992) wrote “the failed war in the Ogaaden completely dissolved the 
integrity of the military and police, the two major guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism” 
(Lewis, 1992; Samatar, 1994).  
After Somalis was badly defeated in the Ogaaden war, in 1978 an abortive coup was carried 
out by Abdullahi Yusuf (a military official from Majerteen clan). Finally the government 
crushed the plot, officials were escaped and later started an opposition movement, called 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), headquartered in Ethiopia. Several attacks 
were carried out by this militias across the border with Ethiopia. Barre regime retaliated the 
Majeerten clan for the coup and formation of SSDF.  
In my thesis, I argue that the effect of the war was savage. I agree with Ahmed Samatar 
(1994) to the point that, “the war destroyed businesses and the major market while mining 
of transport routes virtually shut down trade”. The port of Berbera was closed for exporting 
livestock. Between the years of 1988 – 1991 around 1.2 million animals exported to the 
Gulf states through Berbera port”78 (Samatar, 1994). 
                                                          
76 Lewis (1994) Blood and Bones, A Samatar, `Introduction and overview’, in Samatar (ed), The Somali 
Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienne. 
77 K Cahaill, (1986) `The clinical face of famine in Somalia’, in K Cahill 
78 See for details, Ahmed (1994) `Understanding Household Food Insecurity and Famine Conditions in 
Rural Somaliland’, mimeo, Wye College, University of London, p 401. 
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The other major effect of war was that Somalia’s FDI was dropped intensely after the war. 
(See Figure 8). 
Figure 8 : Somalia FDI Net inflows (Current USD) 1971-1990 
 
3.2.3 Socialist Military Regime and the genocide in the 
North (Somaliland) 
In 1980, another opposition frontline emerged, SNM (Somali National Movement) was 
announced in London by intellectuals and businessmen from the Issaq clan. It has been 
noted the main reason that Isaaq79 clan was dissatisfied with the regime and SNM was 
created comes from different sources: political and democratic under-representation, 
unequal distribution of government resources, and how movement regulated and managed 
the trade and business, especially livestock and Qaat. (Lewis, 1994). 
 
                                                          
79 To understand the Somali Clan Families see Appendix Page: Somali ethnic groups and major Sub clans. 
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In British Somaliland where the Isaaq is the dominant clan, when the two Somali colonies 
untied in 1960, the Isaaqs had an important influence in government, the last two civilian 
governments were headed by a premier from Isaaq (Mohamed Haaji Ibraahim Egaal). In 
Siad Barre’s cabinet, several Isaaqs held posts. Nevertheless, but there was a feeling that 
political representation in Somalia was dominated by clans at the south. 80 
The Northern clans’ decision to unite with their southern brothers in 1960 was what some 
scholars called controversial. The tension of the Somali nationalism was high at the time.  
It was surmised that the unity and putting the dream of ‘Greater Somalia' into reality was 
the major idea on people’s minds.  Even the Isaaqs with their brothers in the south 
supported the war with Ethiopia, to further support the government claim of freeing the 
occupied land in the Ogaadeen. When Somalia was defeated in the war with Ethiopia in 
1977, thousands of refugees fled to the north of Somalia from Ethiopia, this further created 
tension between local clans and the Ogaadeeni refugees in the north. When government 
armed the refugees also driven the fear. In 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed an agreement 
that Ethiopia will control the Ogaadeen land.  
Throughout the 1980s, the regime started a repressive policy against Isaaq. According to 
Africa Watch Committee (1990), a 'leaked' letter, supposedly from the military governor in 
the north to Siad Barre, created a fear among Isaaq clan that the government started a 
genocidal program against themselves. In May 1988 SNM captured the northern cities of 
Hargeisa and Burco when they lost their bases in Ethiopia due to the agreement between 
Ethiopia and the Somali government.  
 
 
                                                          
80 ibid p.59 
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In response to that, Barre with the support of his military and other armed forces launched 
a repressive attack on Isaaq clan that resulted hundreds of thousands killed and other 
thousands fled to neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, and Djibouti. According to 
Africa Watch committee (1990), between May 1988 and March 1989 some 50,000 to 
60,000 people were killed (Africa Watch, 1990).  
Up to this point the SNM had not been widely supported by civilians. These brutal attacks 
finally united the Isaaq behind the SNM for an all-out war against the regime.81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81 ibid 
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 CHAPTER IV:  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to contribute to a better understanding of the existing 
literature about the analysis of the legitimacy, implementation of the “Somali Scientific 
socialism” in Somali republic, it also mainly focused on the economic and political impact 
of this ‘system’ on the Somali state. As discussed in the introductory chapter, during the 
cold war, “Socialism “had become an active promotion in Africa. Some African countries 
including Somalia had pursued an internal policies that have led to totalitarianism and single 
party rule. In the case of Somalia, Mohamed Siad Barre, seized the power in a military coup 
in 1969 and renamed the country the ‘Somalia Democratic Republic’ that he claimed , it 
was based on “Scientific Socialism”, a principle that he himself did not understand. 
 It was argued in this thesis that, Siad Barre who did not have a formal education, did not 
have the basic knowledge of socialist principles, never understood Marxism-Leninism, just 
to please USSR, adopted “Somali Scientific Socialism”, an ideology that [he had claimed] 
`fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society’, but later proofed his 
endeavors the opposite, such as disunity, nepotism, economic failure and political 
disintegration in Somalia.  
During the cold war, Siad Barre aligned Somalia with the Soviets. He mentioned that the 
clan has been outlawed, but at the same time gave a great share to his sub clan. Not only 
clans, but all formal political institutions existed during the civilian regime has been 
suspended. Moreover, all formal government institutions such as, parliament, Supreme 
Court, and political parties were adjourned. Political associations and gathering were 
prohibited, and ‘the death penalty’ for offenders was implemented by the military.   
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When the president of the civilian and the democratically elected regime has been 
assassinated by one of his body guards with the complicity of the military junta, and they 
overthrow the civilian regime, this had created a political vacuum which shapes the central 
political chaos of Somalia till today. 
  As discussed in the literature of the Somali state conflict, Siad Barre promised to the 
Somali nation that, his “Socialism” will bring three important prospects, unity and justice; 
economic independency and sufficiency; and development. However, these has been 
proofed to the opposite. The country had experienced disunity and inequality among clans; 
an economy depending on foreign aid; and food import due to the failure of local agriculture 
and production. 
Moreover, it has been highlighted in the introductory chapter, there are multilateral 
approached of understanding the Somali state conflict. As Makhubela (2010) noted, there 
were many additional problems to the Somali case, the colonial legacy; Siad Barre’s 
repression; competition for land and food resources; clan rivalries; clan inequality; 
exclusion from power and wealth sharing; the economic decline under Barre; the hyper-
militarization of the Somali nation due to the abundance of weapons acquired during the 
years of conflict. However, his analysis is missing the impact of “Somali Socialism “and 
how the economy failed under Barre regime. I argue in this thesis that, “Barre’s Socialism” 
was a major factor of both economic catastrophe and political upheavals in post-independent 
Somalia.     
 Abdi Ismail (2010) himself described the presence of Soviet Union in Somalia as “unhappy 
principle”. Although there is no clear evidence which shows that Moscow orchestrated both 
the assassination of the civilian president and support of the military takeover, there was 
obvious coincided interests.  
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 As discussed in chapter one, the deep presence of Islam in the Somali social fabric and the 
regime’s reluctance to constructively address this issue was the main source of serious 
confrontation between regime and Islam. As far as religion was concerned, Moscow wanted 
to see Somali state based on Marxist-Leninist principles, free from religious influence. In 
contrast, the Somali people, on the other hand, believed that Islam had an indispensable role 
in their political, social and economic spheres of life and could not be excluded from it. 
 Accordingly, chapter two, the second chapter of the thesis, theories on state conflict was 
explained in order to justify the main objectives of doing this research paper. First of all, the 
two major theoretical approaches on Somali state conflict is studied, i.e the instrumentalists 
and traditionalist schools. Secondly, the most crucial and important part of instrumentalist 
theory of the state was explained and the first hypothesis is developed based on this theory.  
In Somali Republic, according to the findings of the data in chapter three, the first hypothesis 
has been supported, that the country’s economy was deeply devastated by the ‘socialist 
policies’. The Somali economy experienced serious macroeconomic crisis, including 
stagnation, poor economic growth, higher deficit ratio and higher unemployment. 
Moreover, the background causes of the Somali state conflict was explained in three 
different periods: pre-colonial period; colonialism period and the socialist state era. . 
As discussed in chapter two, the first view, the traditionalist view, is led by Ioan M. Lewis, 
a British anthropologist who had extensively studied the Somali nomads during the colonial 
period of 1940 and 50s.  The Scholars of the traditionalist thesis argue that, “the continuity 
of clan politics had destroyed the state” (Lewis, 1993, 1994; Said Samatar, 1991; and 
Simons, 1995).  
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Previously, Somalia has been colonized by three European countries, such as Britain, France 
and Italy and in that period, the Somali people has been divided under different state systems 
with the flags of European countries, and some African countries such as Ethiopia which 
took over the Somali Haud Land.82  
 In this thesis, it is argued that, the foreign strategic interests of Somalia has always been 
commercial, because of its location. Soviet Russia used Somalia as a geostrategic place to 
influence the region and to forward its cold war objectives. Historically, Britain started its 
strong hold in Yemen 1839 to protect its trade route to India. France and Italy had also 
signed treaties with some Somali clan leader to express their interest in the region. These 
European colonial powers had left a deep legacy of a system of centralized government 
grafted into an un-centralized political system of a pastoral people. I argue that, the colonial 
system of Somalia had created a complex division among clans (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).  
The other school of thought, instrumentalist argues that, clan is not the problem, it is like an 
institution or ideology used by the elite or ruling class, and outsiders who had a foreign 
interests in Somalia also used it too. As mentioned in chapter two , Ahmed I. Samatar a 
prominent Somali Scholar, argues that the “Somali problem is not the clan reality and its 
culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the real virus of the Somali case”. 
Furthermore, the ‘socialist regime’ of Somalia with the help of soviets used ‘the clan system’ 
as an instrument to control the Somali people. He even used as a political game after the coup 
and according to many scholars, he was the one who re-legitimated the language of tribe in 
Somali Politics (Lewis, 1994; Samatar and Samatar, 2001). 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Present day Somali region of Ethiopia (kilil 5) 
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Somalia was one among the African countries that adopted “Scientific Socialism “as a tool 
for their own economic and political development. A military junta came in power in a 
bloodless coup in 1969; they have closed down the parliament; suspended the constitutions 
and abolished all formal institution.  
Mohamed Siad Barre became a totalitarian dictator. Later, he vowed that the regime’s goal 
was to put an end to tribalism, clan nepotism, corruption in the public sector, and that those 
objectives can be achieved through the adoption of his ‘Scientific Socialism.’ In this 
background the second hypothesis of thesis has been supported by the findings of the thesis, 
but it is challenged.  
As discussed, although Barre vowed that clanism will be replaced by “Somali Scientific 
Socialism” as blue print for democracy, equality and justice, he illegally gave land and water 
rights to specific clans that supported his rule (Bestamen, 1993). 
The final attempt of this thesis was the examination of the impact of “Somali Scientific 
Socialism” on the economy and politics of Somalia with the analytical concepts of 
instrumentalists’ theory. The argument states that conflict based on ethnicity is by the aims 
of the political leaders and this is the central point to “the theory” of Instrumentalism.  
A Brass (1985) argues, “Instrumentalism is an idea which is based upon the concept that 
ethnic conflict is driven by economic wants, greed and grievance or it can be the active 
manipulation of ethnic identities by political leaders for their political gain” (Brass, 
1985:120). Therefore, Soviet Union was the one took all the decisions to implement and use 
it as political tool, for them “Somali Scientific Socialism” was to govern Somalia as 
geostrategic position and advance their regional objectives. They had built military bases, 
they trained thousands of military officers in the Somali Republic, they also gave millions 
of dollars of military aid.  
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As discussed above, Instrumentalism argues that ethnic conflict arises from thoughtful 
manipulation by elites [in the case of Somalia, political leaders with clan leaders] on the 
basis of the rationality decision to encourage ethnic conflict.  
According to his explanation of Instrumentalism, Fenton (2010) noted that “if the conducts 
happening as of ethnic attachments could be seen to be serving a collective political or 
economic ends, then the ethnic action “could be said as instrumental” (Fenton, 2010:74). 
This thesis aim was also to highlight the element of ‘elite’ manipulation by Siad Barre as 
authoritarian leader in the Somali political economy, this system later resulted deep 
economic and social disintegration in Somalia.  
In consequence, the third chapter was prepared as a case study which analyzed mainly the 
impact of “Somali Socialism” on the Somali economy and politics. A short background of 
the political economy of Somali State was given based on the theoretical framework 
developed in chapter two. When Somalia’s military leaders decided for “Socialism” in 1970, 
Soviets had tripled the military aid to Somalia (Lewis, 1967). 83 
For that matter, Lewis (2002) believed that, Somali leaders chose “Scientific Socialism” 
just to lobby their military aid, which has a motive to push forward what they called Somali 
irredentism (Pan-Somalism) objective. Pansomalism was a strategy to unite all Somalis in 
the horn of Africa and to invade Ethiopia claiming it occupies a Somali ‘Huad land’. In this 
thesis it has been argued that, the major objective of the coup leaders was to choose ‘socialist 
style’ economy to further their regional political objectives, such as Pan-somalism84 and 
bringing back the Promised Land in Ethiopia.  
 
                                                          
83 See also Table 1 , Foreign aid to Somalia 1960-170 
84 Pan-Somalism: the Post-World War II ideology favoring a single state for all Somalis. They idea believes 
that, Somalis have common culture and language justifying to create one Somali state.  
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Undoubtedly, there were serious impact of “Somali Scientific Socialism” on the economy 
and politics of Somalia. Economically, Somalia has been very poor, agriculture was the 
major sector of their economy, it contributes highest share to the GDP and export earnings, 
and it also provided the livelihood for the majority of the population. Another important 
sector is an urban private sector (mainly small enterprises and other Businesses) which is 
run by a small commercial class85. The third sector, mainly service sector was dominated 
by the public employees like, military, police, employee of ministries, parliamentarians, and 
other public servants. 
The major arguments of my thesis was that the country’s economy was devastated by the 
“socialist regime”, in the sense that its policies were later diverted and mislead. For the 
regime, “Scientific Socialism” was to build new ‘socialist Somalia’ and grant required 
military facilities from the soviets. Siad Barre secured Soviet’s economic and military 
support. Although the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) convinced to the Somali 
people that, “Socialism” is the only way for the rapid transformation of their country into 
developed and advanced one, but their performances were proofed to the opposite, such as 
clan animosity, foreign aid increment and economic failure.  
The regime created two consecutive development plans in 1971-73 and 1974-1978. As 
shown in the Data used in chapter three, the productive sector of the economy, such as 
Agriculture which constitutes the largest share of the country’s GDP had been neglected. In 
this regard, a small amount of investment were allocated to agriculture and the livestock 
sector, while the unproductive sectors such as government administration has been given 
almost 50% of the investment, such as security and other government administration86.  
                                                          
85 Such as “Urban Intelligentsia” and merchants supported by the regime.  
86 See table 17 for details 
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As some scholars argued, Somalia became one of the highest militarized states in Africa 
(Samatar, 1988; Sofinsky, 1974). If you closely look the status of the economy in this period, 
agriculture, and major industrial productions were devastated.  
Another major economic catastrophe was that, the revolutionary goal of making Somalia 
self-sufficient in food has not been achieved, and Barre failed to decrease the foreign 
dependency in trade, in the meantime , the trade deficit has increased to millions of dollars 
and food import was drastically became high. Although food import existed before military 
regime, it had been increased substantially after the regime’s policy of self-sufficiency and 
economic independency failed.  During the worst drought of 1971, Somalia had had to rely 
on food aid. Barre and his coup leaders promised that “Socialism” will reduce the foreign 
dependency and encourage the economic sufficiency, but the regime’s record was very poor 
and falls short of the goals initially vocalized.  The economic performance was very 
disappointing. In the first years of its rule production of almost all major food crops 
declined, due to lack of investment and lack of proper training of farmers, severe drought 
also contributed to the problem.  This created that the country have to rely on food aid and 
large loans. Somalia’s economy during this period was extremely weak and poor in 
comparison with the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Rwanda. 
Politically, the military government prohibited strikes and death penalty was implemented 
against offenders. SRC which was the supreme council and majority of the members were 
from the military has been appointed to have all the executive decisions. During this period, 
Siad Barre became the judge, executor, law-giver and the supreme authority. The ‘Socialist 
regime’ became authoritarian, there were no constitutional limitations on the power of 
central government and the president. The contraction of country’s economy, excessive 
unwise spending by the socialist regime, such as pouring money on unproductive sectors of 
the (mainly defense and administration) and acute of deficiencies in implementation and 
 87 
 
management have contributed to create a harrowing economic condition on the Somali 
society.  
The major drawback of the public employment was that, the regime ignored the 
deteriorating situation of the public employment sector, the investment in the employment 
sector has dramatically decreased. Moreover, there was a great mismanagement in the 
public expenditure, the economic productive sectors gained few share, and unproductive 
sectors like general services gained almost 90 percent of the public expenditure.  
More importantly, the social services sector like education and health has been totally 
neglected and gained less than 3 percent. Somali military regime invested more on military 
to pursue its regional objectives.  
There were contradictions between the Islamic values and “socialism” in Somalia, in this 
regard, the family act which states that men and women should have the same inheritance 
was not welcomed among the religious scholars, and therefore ten theologians were 
executed in public in 1975. Not only the religious leaders, two major generals from the 
military senior officials were that they were working against the revolutions, later the two 
generals were executed in public. Although the formations of SRSP was to decentralize the 
political structure of Somalia, but General Siad Barre controlled in every aspect of the state 
(see figure 6).  
The thesis concludes that, “Somali Scientific socialism” in Somali Republic had an intense 
negative impact on both the economy and politics of the Somali state, from economic 
catastrophe, for example, failure of agriculture and industrial production, huge trade deficit, 
extensive food import, and complete collapse of the economy to political chaos and tyranny. 
As to, it has made clan division and augmented ethnic clashes due to nepotism, disparity, 
treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare organizations which later ousted 
the regime in 1991. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: The Clan Genealogy of the Somali People 
SAMAALE 
                  
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lyon and Samatar (1996)*, *With some modifications  
SAAB IRIR GARDERE DAAROOD   
Digil 
DIR ISSAAQ HAWIYE  
Tunni  Rahanweyn 
Sagaal Sideed 
Gadabuursi Samaroon Issa 
  
Bimaal 
Habar Haboosheed Habar Magaado 
Awal  Arab Garhajis Ayuub Habarjeclo Toljeclo 
Gurreh Ajuuran Habargidir  Abgal 
Ogaadeen 
Mareehan  
Harti 
Majeerteen  Warsangali  Dhulbahante  
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Appendix B:  Map of ‘Greater Somalia’ 
 
Source: Wikipedia  
